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Abstract

Historically, the United States Congress has acknowledged that a separate branch
of military service is required to exert supremacy over each of the recognized Domains of
Operation. Throughout the evolution of modern warfare, leading minds in military
theory have come to the conclusion that due to fundamental differences inherent in the
theory and tactics that must be employed in order to successfully wage war within a
domain’s associated environment, a specialized force was needed - until now. With the
recent inclusion of Cyberspace as an operational domain by the Department of Defense,
the case should be made that it, too, is far too specialized an area to be rolled up into any
or all of the current branches of service.
This research investigated the concept of cyber power in the 21st century, what it
means to wield it, and how this capability may be used to wage war. It argues that
cyberspace as a domain should be treated no differently than the traditional warfighting
domains: that it, too, is an arena where defense may best be secured by attacking the
enemy, where battles occur for control of territory, where denial affects combat in other
domains, and where political motives dictate the course of hostilities. Because the
strategic challenges and concepts are the same and yet the environment so specialized,
the research concludes that the only way to properly secure the domain and to prosecute
war effectively is to create a U.S. Cyber Force.
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CYBER POWER IN THE 21st CENTURY
I. Introduction
Motivation
There exist today many papers, books, and articles that explore and assert what
one must do to secure and operate in the wild frontier-land of cyberspace. As the advent
of cyberspace and then cyber war manifested itself, scholars began crafting numerous
documents which tried to come to terms with the subject. These writings do an admirable
job at describing the threats and how to counter them, such as Edward Waltz’ book
Information Warfare: Principles and Operations, Gregory Rattray’s Strategic Warfare in
Cyberspace, or Martin C. Libicki’s Defending Cyberspace and Other Metaphors. Some
writings even go so far as to detail policy the writer thinks should be adopted; but the
common theme for all of these documents is to place the onus for enacting these
suggested tactics and policies on an unnamed and undefined shadowy government entity.
Who should be doing this work? Whose responsibility is it to protect our nation’s
cyberspace? The Air Force announced in 2005 that it would “fly and fight in air, space
and cyberspace” [86] and began organizing, training and equipping a cyber force. The
Air Force’s focus has changed slightly: rather than creating a new major command
(MAJCOM) dedicated to cyberspace, Air Force leaders have decided to put cyberspace
operations under Air Force Space Command. [2] However, the Air Force mission retains
a strong (perhaps stronger) emphasis on cyberspace: “The mission of the Air Force is to
fly, fight, and win in air, space and cyberspace.” [22]
The Army and Navy have taken similar steps. In the case of the former, the
Army’s Land Information Warfare Activity was re-designated the 1st Information

1

Operations Command in 2003 to: “deploy information operations support teams in order
to provide IO planning support and vulnerability assessments in support of military forces
and provide an IO reach-back capability to operational and tactical IO staffs as directed;”
[68] and in the case of the latter, Navy brass began laying the groundwork to build a
Naval Cyber Force Command around their existing Naval Network Warfare Command
whose mission is to “deliver integrated cyber mission capabilities in Information
Operations, Intelligence, Network Operations, and Space that enable warfighters across
the full range of military operations” sometime in 2007. [7, 20] Clearly, each service
recognizes the need to master this new domain, but the creation of so many entities
threatens to pull the nation’s capability in too many directions at once.
This document is different. It will not describe tactics or policies for securing or
operating in cyberspace. Rather, this is a document designed to make one think and
provoke discussion. It will draw lessons from both American history and the great
military minds of various other countries and apply them to what is happening with
cyberspace today.
Problem
This research studied the reasons behind the establishment of a separate Army,
Navy, and Air Force; the ways in which each service derives power from strategy in its
respective operational domain; and how a notional Cyber Force might derive power in
cyberspace through strategies of its own. The answers to these questions are of the
utmost importance in determining whether the creation of a separate Cyber Force is
necessary to ensure ongoing American superiority in the domain.
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Objectives
The objectives of this research include establishing that cyberspace is, like the
other operational domains, too specialized a field to leave its mastery up to any or all of
the current branches of military service; to provide insights into how the traditional and
contemporary strategies of warfare used in other domains may be applied in cyberspace;
and to propose a comprehensive set of ideas, tempered by precedent and research, which
may be used in the formulation of a new Cyber Force’s strategy and doctrine. The sum
total of these objectives will show that a separate Cyber Force is required for American
dominance of cyberspace in the 21st Century and beyond.
Approach
To achieve the above listed objectives, one need only look to precedent and
example; both of the past and the present. The answer to who should take charge of
cyberspace resides (as it usually does) within the lessons of previous successes and
failures. There is strong precedent for a separate service to oversee each of the domains
of operation. The reasons are many and diverse, but ultimately come down to strategy.
The last service to come into existence in order to master a domain, the Air Force, was
born of strategy; first high altitude precision daylight bombing and then global nuclear
deterrence. While other services—such as the Navy—may also utilize aircraft to
accomplish their missions, marine aviation is more a source of fires (akin to artillery) and
is largely fleet-centric. The Air Force is considered the lead entity for the Air, and only it
looks at air superiority from a domain control/denial standpoint. Current writings on
cyber power, however, do little to address strategy even though it is now recognized as
the newest warfighting domain. These writings are too far “down in the weeds,” and
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speak specifically of tactics and policy that current services should pursue but lack
greatly in describing where, why, when, and how such tactics and policy should be used
or applied.
Results
The research revealed that the reasons for the creation of a Cyber Force are just as
valid, if not more so than the reasons the three current branches of service to exist today.
Additionally, the research revealed that cyber power shares many common ideas and
nuances of strategy with operations in the other domains which may be applied in order
to better understand the derivation of power and application of warfare in the cyber
domain. Finally, the research also revealed some sound principles and underlying truths
of operations in cyberspace which may be used in order to shape future strategy. The
culmination of these findings strongly suggests the creation of a United States Cyber
Force.
Document Overview
The remainder of this document will describe the research in more detail and is
structured as follows. Chapter II will start with describing what a domain is and why
differing environments call for different strategies. It will make the case that a separate
service is needed to prosecute each of these different strategies based upon the different
laws of nature inherent to each environment. Chapter III will go on to describe what
these strategies for gaining and applying power are within each of the previous four
domains and discuss their respective services’ methods for successful operations.
Additionally, it will synthesize and apply those lessons that can be taken from the other
services’ strategies for dominion to cyberspace and discard the ones that cannot. Chapter
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IV will display an aspect of cyber power and cyber strategy that emerges from the
preceding discussions, which in turn should make a strong argument and basis for the
creation of a separate yet equal branch of the Department of Defense. Finally, Chapter V
will conclude with a summary and recommendations for future research that may be of
use to one establishing a separate U.S. Cyber Force.
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II. A Service for Every Domain
What are Domains?
“Domain” is a word which is often used in the Defense community when discussing the
individual and complex spheres in which combat operations may occur.

Interestingly enough,

despite such common usage there are no formal Department of Defense definitions put forward
for the word. However, it is generally understood that (in a military sense) a domain is a place
where activities are performed to achieve some level of influence or control. This assumes that
there are other actors (hostile, neutral, or benign) who also operate in the domain and wield some
influence—if only to protect their own ability to operate.
Taken in the context with which it is used in innumerable DoD documents, we may infer
that out of the 10 entries listed in the dictionary under “domain,” there are two which, when
melded together, properly describe the word as it relates to warfighting and the military
profession. These two definitions are “a region distinctively marked by some physical feature,”
and “a territory over which dominion is
exercised.” [21]
The commonly accepted and understood
military “warfighting domains” are land, sea, air
and space. [51] However, doctrine only defines
two of them, and both definitions are problematic.
Land, Sea, and Air do not receive DoD definitions,
and Space is defined as: “A medium like the land,
sea, and air within which military activities shall
be conducted to achieve US national security
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Figure 1 - Cyberspace exists across and affects
objects in the other four domains

objectives.” [74]. These first four domains are within the human experience: we can sense them
and interact within those domains daily. Therefore they are somewhat self-explanatory.
Cyberspace is different. It involves physical equipment and technology, but much of it
has a virtual aspect. This makes it difficult to explain in terms that are on par with the other
warfighting domains. For this reason, there have been many attempts to define what exactly
cyberspace is, and these definitions change over time. Within the Department of Defense alone,
establishing a clear understanding of what’s in and what’s not has proven difficult. This is not a
new problem: many of the fundamental ideas about cyberspace trace back to the early 1990s
when information warfare (IW) attracted a lot of attention as a new way of fighting wars, but
these concepts were abstract and difficult to integrate with traditional physical/kinetic operations.
More recently, the National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations (NMS-CO), published
in 2006, defined cyberspace as “a domain characterized by the use of electronics and the
electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems and
associated physical infrastructure”. [80] This definition, while rather broad in scope, is at least
grounded in physics and allows for more direct comparison with the other physical domains of
warfare.
An even more recent official Department of Defense definition was released in May
2008: “a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent
network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications
networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.” [26] Although this
definition places emphasis on the Internet, it includes wireless networks, tactical data links, and
any other network through which information is shared.
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This most recent definition of cyberspace seems to emphasize the technology aspects of
the domain. This is true of all of the domains, since military operations are increasingly
dependent on technology to exploit and control the domain. The maritime domain could not be
effectively controlled until man could build suitable vessels; likewise prior to powered air- and
spacecraft, controlling the air and space domains would not have been possible. The land domain
is also largely dependent on technology (artillery and armor), although a society that does not
have advanced technology can still wield some influence, even if it is with rocks and spears.
Although cyberspace may have a physical infrastructure, much of the cyber domain
exists within virtual spaces that we cannot perceive with our five senses. The only way that
humans may interact with and influence these areas of the fifth domain is through the use of
tools which harness the power of the electromagnetic spectrum in order to send commands
across networks to be interpreted by man-made machines. This virtual space is not a realm into
which humans may enter. As a result, these repeated attempts to define the domain have
floundered.
Another reason Cyberspace is so ambiguous in the human mind is that of the five
domains, cyberspace is in effect a man-made domain. Clearly, the electromagnetic spectrum is
not man-made, but the information systems that make up the cyberspace environment are manmade. Without routers and switches and radio transmitters, there is no need to try and discuss
cyberspace as a warfighting domain. Humans have created the domain, primarily to support and
enable operations in the other domains. Because of this, warfighters will need to protect their
own ability to use the cyberspace domain, while hindering an adversary’s ability to do so. This
contest for control and influence is what it means to have cyberspace as a warfighting domain.
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Of the five domains, Land seems to be the least technology-dependent. Cavemen could
have squabbles over who had the best caves, relying on their fists, feet, and teeth they were born
with.
After the domain of Land, which has always existed, came the domain of Sea. While the
environment the domain would eventually encompass had always existed, the technology to
exploit it did not. It took the invention of the ship before dominion could begin to be exercised
over the high seas. It is not known when the first ships were invented, but, there are depictions
of pole barges in Egypt that are at least 6,000 years old, and evidence exists that the Greeks and
Phoenicians invented galleys sometime between the years 1200 to 900 BC. [55] Regardless of
the exact date, the warfighting domain was created as soon as technology for controlling the
maritime environment was available.
Why a Separate Army and Navy?
To summarize, a domain is “a region distinctively marked by some physical feature” [21]
over which humans attempt to exert control or dominance. Given this understanding of a
warfighting domain, let us explore why separate military branches (services) have evolved to
properly exploit each domain. One reason is that the nature of the environment itself is unique
for each case. For example, the land and sea environments are characterized by similar features
such as climate and geography, but they differ greatly in how we move about (operate) within
the environment. Physics concepts such as gravity, force, acceleration, kinetic and potential
energy govern the motion of bodies in each domain. There may be some similarities across the
domains, but each has its own tenets, principles, technologies, and doctrine for operating in that
environment. Merely possessing the technology (tools) is not enough to contest a warfighting
domain. Potential adversaries and competitors may also wish to exercise dominion over an
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environment to protect or promote their interests. Preserving the ability to operate (and prevail)
in a domain then involves developing technologies that remain ahead of or at least on par with
those of any potential adversary—in essence an arms race.
Effective employment of technologies requires an intimate knowledge of the environment
in order to create a sensible strategy that makes use of good tactics and technology that are
specially tailored to the environment. Assuming equivalent technologies exist, superiority in a
domain may very well depend on which side better understands how to fight in that domain. It is
possible to appoint leaders and recruit people to draft strategy and execute operations in
environments they do not fully understand, but this practice would likely lead to defeat against a
more experienced adversary. In fact, there have been numerous cases where superior technology
was either nullified or defeated through superior doctrine and tactics.
In 1775, a coalition of thirteen former British colonies found themselves in need of an
armed, land-based force to prosecute their rebellion against the tyranny of English rule. And so
it was that on June 14th, the newly formed Second Continental Congress adopted “the American
Continental Army.” Provisions were made for the recruitment of ten companies of riflemen,
along with a requirement to draft the necessary enlistment forms and the appointment of a
committee to write the rules and regulations for the government of the new army. From that
point, the army rapidly expanded in size as the individual colonies’ militiamen were brought
under the Continental Army’s umbrella. Troop numbers quickly soared to around 27,000 men
towards the end of July of that year, most of which were pressed into the defense of Boston
under the Army’s first Commander-in-Chief, General George Washington; the remainder were
stationed in New York. [84] General Washington was avidly interested in the military arts from a
young age, and had been commissioned a Lieutenant Colonel in 1754 to fight in the beginning

10

skirmishes of the French and Indian War. The next year, he was assigned to serve as an aide to
British General Edward Braddock, which he did until 1759. [57]
Soon after the establishment of the Army, Congress realized that fighting the British on
land was all well and good, but there was a need to harry and disrupt their resupply of troops and
equipment from across the Atlantic as well. Maritime operations were already being undertaken
by the Army; General Washington had taken command of three armed schooners under
Continental authority to intercept British supply ships near Massachusetts. However, Congress
decided to add yet more ships to this force and establish a separate Continental Navy on the 13th
of October, 1775 by authorizing the procurement, outfitting, manning, and dispatch of two
additional armed vessels and sending them in search of ships supplying the British Army in
America. The Continental Navy eventually consisted of some 50 ships over the course of the
war, with approximately 20 warships active at its maximum strength. [18] The legislation drafted
by Congress also established a Naval Committee to write the necessary rules and regulations,
just as it had with the Army four months earlier, and appointed Commodore Esek Hopkins as the
first Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Commodore Hopkins had been a seafaring man from a
young age, captaining merchant vessels and going on to be a successful privateer during the
French and Indian War before being appointed to this high office. [17] He seemed an excellent
choice for the command.
It is apparent that Washington and Hopkins were chosen to lead their respective services
because of the very different training, study, and experiences they had received in their chosen
domains. Congress realized that because the nature of Land and Sea were so different, they
needed to appoint leaders who were well versed in their environments. Land commanders and
troops needed to know about such things as forced marches, supply lines, terrain, elevation,
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fighting formations, and volley fire. Naval commanders and sailors needed to understand
navigation by sextant, water currents, broadsides, weather, tides, sail trim, tacking, ropes and
knot tying, etc. It is doubtful that a naval campaign against the British Navy organized by
General Washington would have had the success that the campaign organized by Commodore
Hopkins had; nor could we conclude that Hopkins would have been as successful in the ground
campaign as Washington.
There is much evidence that strategy and tactics alone won the colonies their
independence, and that these stratagems would not have been as effective had they been created
by people who did not fully understand their respective domains. The English had more men,
more money, better equipment, more combat experience, and the best Navy in the world with
100 Ships of the Line, while the colonists had many forces which were described by one of their
own Generals, Philip Schuyler of New York, as “weak in numbers, dispirited, naked, destitute of
provisions, without camp equipage, with little ammunition, and not a single piece of cannon.”
[5] Both the Continental Army and Navy were new creations, without tradition or even military
experience. [5] However, what the English didn’t have was superior strategy and tactics.
General Washington’s fighting style is characterized by a letter he wrote to Congress stating:
“we should on all Occasions avoid a General Action, or put anything to the Risque, unless
compelled by a necessity, into which we ought never to be drawn.” [57] An example is his
famous nighttime crossing of the Delaware River to surprise and engage the English at the Battle
of Trenton. [57] Meanwhile, the British strategy focused more upon taking and holding coastal
cities through the use of their superior sea power rather than engaging the bulk of the enemy
forces which were mainly garrisoned in the interior and the rural areas of America. [4]
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Already, at the very beginnings of our young nation, Congress recognized the fact that a
separate force with a separate set of skills, separate chain of command, and a separate way of
thinking was required for each domain of operations it was necessary to wage war in, even if
they did not yet coin or speak in these terms. Because of the fundamentally different attributes
and laws of nature inherent in each of the environments that encompass every domain and the
tactics necessary to properly exploit them, this view would prove to be borne out when next it
became feasible to wage war in a new domain.
Along Came Air… and Space.
Aeronautics opened up to men a new field of action, the field of the air. In so doing it of
necessity created a new battlefield; for wherever two men meet, conflict is inevitable.
-Gen. Giulio Douhet
The first military application of airborne technology occurred during the French
Revolutionary War, when France utilized a tethered hydrogen balloon to observe the troop
movements of the Austrian army at the Battle of Fleurus in 1794. [72] Although lighter-than-air
aircraft technology was invented in France, it quickly spread to other countries and was
eventually adopted by American military forces in 1861 for use during the Civil War. The
technology was employed in much the same way that France had; a stationary, tethered balloon
used for reconnaissance and observation of battlefield troop movements. [71] Although these
tools were helpful reconnaissance assets, one could not really argue that they allowed for the
dominance or control of the air environment.
On December 17, 1903, Wilbur and Orville Wright made history by successfully
accomplishing the world’s first powered, sustained, and heavier-than-air flight at Kitty Hawk,
North Carolina. [66] Now that the technology had been invented that would make possible the
dominion of the air, advancements into the warfighting capabilities of this new invention would
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progress swiftly. In the following few years, advances occurred in airfoil design, lightweight
propulsion systems, aerodynamics, control systems, and weaponry. It should be noted that this
rapid progress in airplane technology was mainly the result of a European arms race in the air
domain during WWI (American wartime aviation having been deemed a novelty and
unnecessary to combat operations by the War Department). [40] During this time, much of each
opposing countries’ aircraft technology was nearly identical—or at best only marginally superior
in one technical area or another. As a result, the two early air power theorists—Italian Giulio
Douhet and American Billy Mitchell—believed that defeating an enemy whose technology was
at least equal to one’s own required superior strategy, tactics, and doctrine. To this end, they
continually formulated and expounded their views on the nature of air power, all the time
arguing that a separate military branch would be required to fully exploit this new domain.
Their stories are remarkably parallel. Both men leapt at the chance to be a part of the
emerging world of aviation in the early 1900’s and both argued vehemently with their respective
leadership on the role of airpower in warfare. Likewise, both men were subsequently courtmartialed for their vigorous criticism of military orthodoxy (in Douhet’s case, he was also
imprisoned for a year) and then reinstated and promoted to General when their views eventually
proved to be correct. [23, 45] General Douhet wrote in his 1921 book “The Command of the
Air,”
Though an army is primarily a land force, it possesses a navigable means of warfare
which it can use to help integrate its land operations; and that fact does not preclude the
navy’s accomplishing, solely with its own naval means, war missions from which the
army is completely excluded. Similarly, while a navy is primarily a sea force, it
possesses land means of warfare which it may use to assist and integrate its naval
operations; and that fact does not preclude the army’s carrying out war missions solely
with its own land means, entirely independent of any naval means. In like manner, both
the army and navy may well possess aerial means to aid and integrate their respective
military and naval operations; but that does not preclude the possibility, the
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practicability, even the necessity, of having an air force capable of accomplishing war
missions solely with its own means, to the complete exclusion of both the army and navy.
In such case, an air force should logically be accorded equal importance with the army
and navy and bear the same relation to them as they now bear to each other. Obviously,
both the army and the navy, each in its own field, must operate toward the same
objective—i.e., to win the war. They must act accordingly, but independently of each
other. To make one dependant on the other would restrict the freedom of action of the
one or the other, and thus diminish their total effectiveness. Similarly, an air force
should at all times co-operate with the army and the navy; but it must be independent of
them both. [23]
It is at this juncture that I must take a moment to speak about one of General Douhet’s
hypotheses in the above excerpt: Possessing the means to operate in an environment other than
the one to which your service has been assigned in order to accomplish some facet of your
mission does not render another service obsolete. The ability to use and exploit an environment
in order to achieve goals in some other domain and the ability to wage war and create effects in
the new domain are two very different things. Until the air environment was understood well
enough to become a warfighting domain, the Army used it to support its other many functions.
For example, artillery shells fly through the air, and powered aircraft were also used to observe
the battleground and provide situational awareness for ground commanders. But neither of these
involves creating effects in the air environment in order to control it or deny an adversary’s use
of the air environment.
So what, then, constitutes the materiel belonging to a certain domain? Do artillery shells
necessarily “belong” to the air domain because they travel through the air? Of course not. They
are simply tools, and a tool does not belong to a domain. The things that “belong” to a domain
are the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel and facilities
(DOTMLPF). The doctrine includes strategy and tactics regarding the proper employment of
warfighting capabilities, usually based on experimentation and lessons learned. Conflicts over
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who should “own” a domain usually arise because of the funding and other resourcing
constraints when allocating roles and missions.
Continuing the remarkable parallelisms between the two
theorists, Mitchell also wrote a book on Air Power published in
1921, titled “Our Air Force.” In it, he wrote:
No navies can operate on the seas, nor armies on the land, until the air forces have first
attained a decision against the opposing air forces, so as to allow those on the water to
operate against their enemy. Therefore, as a prelude to any engagement of military or
naval forces, a contest must take place for control of the air. The first battles of any
future war will be air battles. The nation winning them is practically certain to win the
whole war, because the victorious air service will be able to operate and increase
without hindrance. Under these conditions, it is essential that they can be mobilized and
put into fighting condition immediately that war appears imminent, to take the air and
protect the country in the way that it deserves. [45]
Both men knew that a separate and equal air force whose sole purpose was to focus on
perfecting warfare in and from the air was required to adequately protect their respective nations
from enemy air forces and take the battle to the enemy from over the front lines. As Billy
Mitchell was later quoted, “Just as the navy always thinks first of battleships and makes aviation
secondary to that, the army thinks only of the infantry and makes aviation a secondary matter.”
[46]
That is not to say that Douhet and Mitchell agreed upon every aspect of war in the Air
domain. Douhet’s vision of air power was mainly strategic and offensive in nature, and called
for massive bombardment of large population centers in order to demoralize the civilian
populace, [23] while Mitchell advocated a mostly tactical air force that would perform defensive
and offensive aerial roles (he proposed four branches of aviation: Pursuit, Bombardment, Attack,
and Observation), along with precision tactical bombing of military and war-making facilities.
[45] To that end, General Mitchell was determined to demonstrate to congress that Airpower
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alone, left unchecked, could decide the outcomes of battles, and possibly wars, in the other two
known domains. He was going to prove his statement of 1919, that “Only an air force can fight
air force. Only an air force can keep ships afloat in war.” [9] He was going to prove that
battleships without air protection could be sunk by airplanes alone.
General Mitchell made a request to the Appropriations Committee to use German ships
for his demonstrations. These ships had been acquired through the treaties of WWI and were
scheduled for destruction. [34] The Appropriations Committee agreed to hold a hearing on
February 20, 1921 in which General Mitchell would state his case. Before General Mitchell was
called to speak, several officials from the Army and Navy testified as to how useless airplanes
would be against ships at sea, but when Billy Mitchell was called to the stand he caused a ripple
of excitement throughout the room by stating: “We can tell you definitely now that we can either
destroy or sink any ship in existence today.” [44] Of course, there had been no tests and he was
not at all sure that it could be done, but he was willing to stake his career and reputation on the
fact in order to be given the chance to try and prove his ideas correct. The Chairman then asked
him if he really believed that, to which General Mitchell replied “Yes, sir, absolutely. All we
want is to have you gentlemen watch us attack a battleship.” [44] The Chairman then asked him
if the Navy also considered the tests important to national security, to which he replied “I cannot
answer for them. Their whole training is that the armored ship is the mistress of the sea.
Whereas actually it is just as helpless as was once the proud armored knight on horseback when
gunfire first was brought against him.” [44]
The Appropriations Committee subsequently granted General Mitchell’s request to use
several of the German ships for his aerial bombardment tests. One of these was the battleship
Ostfriesland, the finest the German Navy had at the end of the war. A bombsight and some

17

2,000-pound bombs were then developed, along with theories based on the “water hammer”
which dictated that bombs should explode underwater just off the side of a ship for maximum
effect. [34] The tests were carried out, and on July 21, 1921, the Ostfriesland was sunk just as
Mitchell expected. General Williams, Chief of ordinance, was heard to say: “A bomb was fired
today which will be heard around the world.” [34] Billy Mitchell’s ideas were proved correct,
and would eventually help to usher in a new chapter to modern warfare.
In the meantime however, Congress would choose not to act upon General Mitchell’s
recommendations despite his best efforts, and American aviation would continue to flounder for
another 20 years. During the Interwar Years, the Army retained control of aviation in the form
of the Army Air Corps, but the corps was undermanned and not well funded. More than 15,000
flying officers trained during WWI had been dismissed from the Air Service to return to their
civilian lives, and air power was not viewed as a priority to national defense. [45]
Conditions were ripe for disaster, until eventually the inevitable happened. On
December the 7th, 1941 six Japanese aircraft carriers launched 351 airplanes in a sneak attack
against the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. During the attack, 21 ships of the Pacific Fleet were
sunk or damaged, 347 airplanes were destroyed or damaged, and 2,403 Americans were killed.
Only 29 Japanese planes—less than 10%—were lost. The attack was a massive blow to the
America’s national psyche and its military power in the Pacific theater. The oceans could no
longer protect the heartland. [19]
At the time just before the United States entered WWII, the newly designated US Army
Air Forces (USAAF) consisted of approximately 23,000 officers and men, only 2,500 of whom
were rated pilots, and about 1,200 mostly obsolete combat aircraft—a force which lagged behind
all the major world powers in the number and quality of its aircraft. The attack at Pearl Harbor
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demonstrated what uncontested air power could do, and Major General Henry “Hap” Arnold,
began building up the USAAF in earnest. Within five years after the US entered the war on
December 8, 1941, the USAAF’s strength expanded significantly to 2.4 million troops and
70,000 planes. [6] Obviously, air power was now a military and national priority.
Throughout the remainder of WWII, General Arnold had been quietly laying the
framework for an independent, strategic-minded air force. During the Interwar years, the War
Department had generally viewed air power as a tool for defense and ground support operations.
Air power theorists such as Hap Arnold, Billy Mitchell, and Ira Eaker believed that heavy, long
range strategic bombers could be used (along with fighter escorts) alone to determine the course
of war. Their theory was largely based on high-altitude strategic daylight bombing, but the
theory was unproven. The Air Corps and General Arnold fought unsuccessfully for several years
to get a portion of the Army’s small budget allocated for purchasing some Boeing B-17 bombers
for this purpose, but they were continually stymied. As General MacArthur stated in one of his
annual reports: “So far as tactical and strategic doctrine is concerned, there exist two great fields
of Air Force employment; one fully demonstrated and proved, the other conjectural.” [53] In his
mind, ground support had been “proved,” while strategic bombing and other air power theories
had not. Eventually however, with war in Europe looming and President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
belief that “airplanes were the war implements that would have an influence on Hitler’s
activities,” [53] Congress eventually approved the expansion of the air arm in 1939. Included
within the expansion were over 100 of the new four-engine bombers. [53]
When war began, Arnold was promoted to lieutenant general and became a member of
the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff. This was
implicit recognition that the air force was equal to and independent of sea and land forces. This
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move also matched the British staffing pattern and would ensure that Arnold’s views were not
filtered through an Army (i.e., ground force) bias. [6] Arnold made good use of his position,
always politicking with other high ranking military and political officials. Three weeks after
Germany invaded Russia, President Roosevelt requested estimates of the “overall production
requirements needed to defeat our potential enemies.” Arnold advocated that the Air War Plans
Division (AWPD) be allowed to prepare its own annex to the War Plans Division’s document.
The AWPD developed AWPD-1, which was nothing less than a plan for defeating Germany by
means of aerial bombardment alone. General George C. Marshall, War Department Chief of
Staff, decided the plan had merit, and the spirit of the plan was approved at the Anglo-American
conference in Washington in December, 1941. There is debate whether the war would have been
won by air power alone, but subsequent bombing raids on Axis centers of gravity such as the oil
refineries at Ploesti, the ball-bearing factory at Schweinfurt, and the U-boat yards at
Wilhelmshaven would prove the importance of strategic air power in warfare. [53]
Throughout WWII, the increasing importance of a strong air arm reasserted itself time
and again. In March 1942, the War Department issued Circular 59, War Department
Reorganization, which was based largely on recommendations from General Arnold and which
reorganized the Army into three autonomous commands: the Army Air Forces (AAF), Army
Ground Forces (AGF), and the Army Service Forces (ASF). [53] Field Manual (FM) 100-20,
Command and Employment of Air Power, was released in July of 1943. This document stated
unequivocally that land power and air power were coequal and that the gaining of air superiority
was the first requirement for the success of any major land operation. It went on to say:
The inherent flexibility of air power is its greatest asset. This flexibility makes it possible
to employ the whole weight of available air power against selected areas in turn; such
concentrated use of the air striking force is a battle-winning factor of the first
importance. Control of available air power must be centralized and command must be
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exercised through the Air Force commander if this inherent flexibility and ability to
deliver a decisive blow are to be fully exploited. Therefore, the command of air and
ground forces in a theater of operations will be vested in the superior commander
charged with the actual conduct of operations in the theater, who will exercise command
of air forces through the air force commander and command of ground forces through
the ground force commander. [83]
Finally, Japan’s capitulation and unconditional surrender after both the battle of Midway
and the dropping of nuclear bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki unequivocally demonstrated in
a dramatic fashion that air power could be decisive. The combination of these factors— the
development of air warfare theory and strategy by pioneers such as Billy Mitchell and Giulio
Douhet, advances in technology (bombers, fighters, bombs), skillful advocacy and politicking for
resources by Hap Arnold, and demonstrated successes during WWII—ultimately resulted in the
creation of a separate military service for fighting in the air domain. President Harry S. Truman
signed the National Security Act of 1947, which established three military service departments
(Army, Navy, and Air Force), under a consolidated Department of Defense (DoD). Truman had
earlier stated: “Air power has been developed to a point where its responsibilities are equal to
those of land and sea power, and its contribution to our strategic planning is as great. Parity for
air power can be achieved in one department or in three, but not in two. As between one
department and three, the former is infinitely preferred.” [6] The National Security Act became
effective September 18, 1947—the US Air Force was finally born.
…and Space
It would take another 10 years after the birth of the Air Force (54 years after the
technology was invented that made possible the dominion of the air) before another new
environment would emerge as a possible candidate for a warfighting domain. On October 4,
1957, the Soviet Union successfully launched the first man-made satellite, Sputnik I, into orbit
around the earth. [54] It was a spectacular technological achievement and spurred the US into
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action to quickly develop space technology of its own. Tensions of the Cold War and
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threats were already high as the US and Soviet Union
entered into a space race which would rapidly expand.
However, because of the extreme expense and difficulty of putting an object into orbit
and the technical complexity of orbital mechanics, maneuver, and targeting, both the Eisenhower
and Kennedy administration wished to avoid an arms race in space. Giulio Douhet’s earlier
quotation of “…wherever two men meet, conflict is inevitable” was not to hold true for Space in
a literal sense. While it is true that earthly conflicts have occurred over the use of space, there
have been no actual conflicts within space itself. As noted in the 1958 law creating the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), “The Congress declares that it is the policy of
the United States that activities in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of
mankind.” [6] This includes transnational overflights for spacecraft in orbit.
The Eisenhower Administration believed that “peaceful purposes” included national
defense support missions such as reconnaissance and communications. The DoD was given the
responsibility for developing and operating these defensive systems in space. DoD Directive
5160.22 (September 1, 1970) subsequently declared that “the Air Force will have the
responsibility of development, production, and deployment of space systems for warning and
surveillance of enemy nuclear capabilities, and all launch vehicles, including launch and orbital
support operations.” [6]
Over the next decade, the Cold War space race between the US and USSR escalated
dramatically—the Soviets launched nearly 100 satellites in 1981. This resulted in an increased
interest in the creation of space doctrine and the establishment of a space organization. These
calls, along with the Reagan administration’s build up of the military, the rapid growth of space
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technology and advanced satellites (military and commercial), and the development of the Space
Shuttle all set the stage for Air Force Chief of Staff General Lew Allen’s June 21, 1982
announcement of the formation of Air Force Space Command, effective September 1, 1983. [6]
By now the parallels between the development of air and space organizations and
professionals should be evident. In each case, technology was developed to operate in and
exploit the air/space environment; theory and doctrine for employing the technology to control
the domain were then developed; and finally, an organization was created to provide advocacy
and sustainment of the force.
The similarity ends there, however. The first commander of AFSPC, Gen. James V.
Hartinger, was only half correct in his statement: “Space is a place… It is a theater of operations,
and it was just a matter of time until we treated it as such.” [61] Space is indeed an operational
environment, a strategic high ground of sorts. However, we have not really treated it as a
warfighting domain in the same sense as sea, land and air. While there has been talk of a
separate branch of the military for space, there has been insufficient justification because the
domain has largely been uncontested.
There are a couple of reasons why this is the case. First, nations have artificially limited
their activities in the space environment, specifically prohibiting certain military activities. There
are a number of international treaties and resolutions on the subject, such as the Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1967). Article II of this treaty specifically
states:
Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other
means .[1]
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While Article IV states:
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place into orbit around the earth any objects
carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such
weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.
The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty
exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and
fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers
on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific
research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any
equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial
bodies shall also not be prohibited. [1]
The second reason Space is not a true warfighting domain is that there has not
been—outside of testing and experiments—attempts to control space, at least in the same sense
as in the other domains. Until there is sufficient threat—to include possible loss of life and/or
space assets—it is difficult to argue for building up an offensive and defensive capability. This
in turn limits our ability to develop tactics and doctrine for warfighting, because doctrine is a
distillation of historical vignettes, case studies, and lessons learned. Short of experimenting and
testing theories in practice, it is difficult to learn anything. Hap Arnold and others strongly
believed in the need for a separate military service focused on the air domain, but it was only
after airmen demonstrated their worth in WWII that the need for a separate air force received any
traction. We have not yet had a similar experience in the space environment.
Joint Publication 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, states the four primary
mission areas in space thusly: “Within the domain of space operations, there are four primary
mission areas: space control, force enhancement, space support, and force application,”
described in more detail below:
Space control operations provide freedom of action in space for friendly forces while,
when directed, denying it to an adversary, and include the broad aspect of protection of
US and US allied space systems and negation of enemy adversary space systems.
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Space control operations encompass all elements of the space defense mission and
include offensive and defensive operations by friendly forces to gain and maintain space
superiority and situational awareness if events impact space operations.
Space force enhancement operations multiply joint force effectiveness by enhancing
battlespace awareness and providing needed warfighter support. There are five force
enhancement functions: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; integrated
tactical warning and attack assessment; environmental monitoring; communications;
and position, velocity, time, and navigation.
Space support operations consist of operations that launch, deploy, augment, maintain,
sustain, replenish, deorbit, and recover space forces, including the command and control
network configuration for space operations. Support operations consist of spacelift,
satellite operations, and deorbiting and recovering space vehicles, if required.
Space force application operations consist of attacks against terrestrial-based targets
carried out by military weapons systems operating in or through space. Currently, there
are no space force application assets operating in space. [77]
Not all of these missions are currently practiced. Space control functions are
generally limited to protective and defensive measures (to prefer our own ability to use
the environment). As stated in the Joint Publication, there are no current capabilities
regarding force application. Lt Col Martin E.B. France characterized these shortcomings
well in his paper on the subject:
Not only does the United States possess no comprehensive means of directly attacking an
adversary’s space forces on orbit, it also lacks any ability to actively defend its assets
already on orbit from a surface-based or orbital attack. The result is an unprecedented
amount of wealth representing overwhelming strategic value left undefended in space
today, with the target date for fielding systems capable of protection and negation in
space no sooner than 2020 by even the most optimistic forecast. While the distances and
speeds involved make directly attacking our assets admittedly difficult, the possibility of a
successful, limited attack using technology available to any spacefaring nation or even
some limited to intermediate range ballistic missiles is real. The result is an assumed
sense of space superiority that exists if for no other reason than no successful,
documented attacks on U.S. systems have yet occurred. [29]
Given all of this, much of Space Command’s role (at least to the extent that can be
discussed here) is that of caretaker. It launches space vehicles and tracks their orbits, maintains
ICBM’s, watches for enemy launches, and monitors national airspace. Its one “space-as-a25

warfighting-domain” function is maneuvering of satellites into appropriate positions for
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) purposes.
Space law and treaties do leave open the possibility of conventional weapons platforms,
national security assets, and self defense of space vehicles and equipment; however, no nations,
including the United States, have yet to venture down this road with the exception of the
aforementioned ISR satellites, which are in essence the space-equivalent of the observation
balloons in the Civil War (albeit at a much greater height). If we continued to use the air
environment for observation purposes, then it is highly unlikely that we would have an air force,
let alone an air domain. It only becomes a domain when parties struggle for control of the
environment. This is the current situation with space.
Given these two major constraints and the limited resources provided, Air Force Space
Command admirably discharges its responsibilities. Eventually, space may be more fully
utilized as a warfighting domain, which would shift priorities and resource allocation
accordingly. Until that happens, we will continue to use outer space primarily as a parking lotfor
communications, navigation, ISR and other purposes, which primarily support terrestrial
operations.
Cyberspace Emerges.
As is so often the case, history was soon to repeat itself in regards to another new
domain. In the early 1940’s, J. Presper Eckert and John Mauchly were the “Wright Brothers” of
their time in the fledgling field of computers. Whereas Orville and Wilber’s invention of the
first powered aircraft made possible the exploitation of the air environment, John Eckert and
John Mauchly’s invention was to make possible the exploitation of a new environment that
would be created a scant only a few years after the first successful space launches—an

26

environment which would exist only within a network of machines. Eckert and Mauchly had
invented the first all-electronic computer, dubbed the ENIAC or Electronic Numerical Integrator
and Computer. [70] At that time, computers were merely tools; they were able to increase
humanity’s quality of life by doing complex calculations and storing information for easy
retrieval, but could not directly affect human’s lives. Although the invention of the computer
brought forth the tool necessary to exert dominion over an environment much as the airplane did
for Air in 1903, the comparison ends there with the fact that the environment that the computer
would exploit did not yet exist. It would take the invention of computer networking in the late
60’s and early 70’s to bring the new environment into existence.
In 1962, the US Air Force commissioned a RAND Corporation study on how it could
maintain positive command and control over strategic missiles and bombers after a nuclear
attack. RAND’s final proposal was a packet switched network, which ultimately laid the
groundwork for the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET). The
ARPANET contract was awarded in 1968 to a company called BBN out of Massachusetts, who
completed construction of a 50 Kbps network between the University of California at Los
Angeles, Stanford Research Institute, the University of California at Santa Barbara, and the
University of Utah in 1969. [37] Cyberspace was born.
In 1973, the unreliability of the first network protocol and the growing number of hosts
(now over 23!) prompted the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to begin
development of a new transmission and routing protocol which would come to be known as
TCP/IP. TCP/IP was really two protocols—TCP (transmission control protocol) provided for
flow control and assured delivery, whereas the internet protocol (IP) provided for addressing the
network nodes and routing of traffic through the network. Three years later, the DoD mandated
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the use of TCP/IP for all hosts connected to ARPANET by January 1st, 1983. In 1981, the
National Science Foundation created their own backbone, called CSNET for use by people who
did not have access to ARPANET and proposed a plan for an interconnection between the two
networks. In 1983, the University of Wisconsin created the Domain Name Service, or DNS.
DNS was an important step in that it provided a quick way of translating between human
readable addresses (e.g., www.msn.com) to machine readable addresses (e.g., 65.54.152.126).
Over the next decade, many new network technologies were developed, but they were primarily
limited to universities, research laboratories, and military agencies. In 1992, the World Wide
Web was introduced by CERN (European Organization for Nuclear Research), and Delphi began
offering commercial internet subscriber service. In 1993 InterNIC was created by the National
Science Foundation to provide internet services through three vendors: AT&T, Network
Solutions Inc., and General Atomics/CERFNet. In 1995, all pretenses to the limitation of
commercial use disappeared when the NSF ended its sponsorship of the internet backbone—
America Online, Prodigy, and CompuServe (among others) quickly moved into the fray to offer
their own internet services. From the time the internet went commercial in 1992 to the time the
NSF officially ended its sponsorship of the backbone (just four years), the amount of hosts
connected to the internet jumped from 1.1 million to 6.6 million. [37]
The internet spread to all corners of the world, growing at an exponential rate. There are
now approximately 500,000,000 hosts connected to the internet, which are located in every
country in the world. [33] Along with massive growth came an increasingly heavy reliance upon
cyberspace for the more technologically advanced nations. Paper records were eschewed in
favor of electronic storage and retrieval over computer networks (i.e., the “paperless office”),
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems were networked to facilitate remote
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control of industrial processes, online banking and commerce became the norm, communications
were increasingly routed over packet switched networks, and unmanned vehicles were controlled
with radio frequency signals. With this plethora of information, control, and wealth reachable
from across the internet came exponentially increasing vulnerabilities to attacks from
individuals, organized crime syndicates, and even nation-states seeking to steal, destroy, modify,
or disrupt the flow of information. In short, cyberspace has become a center of gravity for our
nation and many others; further, it is a contested environment in which people and organizations
are attempting to control, deny, or restrict our own ability to use and exploit the environment—in
other words, cyberspace is a domain, just like air, land and sea.
As such a need was recognized to be able to hold another’s cyberspace capabilities at risk
while defending our own. On December 5th, 2005 the Air Force declared that Cyberspace was
an operational domain in which it would fly and fight. Former Secretary of the Air Force
Michael W. Wynne confirmed the risks and justified the new domain by stating: “What we are
seeing is that the Cyberspace Domain contains the same seeds for criminal, pirate, transnational,
and government-sponsored mischief as we have contended within the Domains of Land, Sea,
Air, and now contemplate as Space continues to mature.” [85]
Up to this point, authorities on the doctrinal subjects of warfare have tried to link each
Operational Domain to a naturally occurring environment. In the case of Cyber, these authorities
attempt to tie said domain to the electromagnetic “environment,” and later to an information
“environment.” [73, 26] However, neither electromagnetism nor information can be
environments. Electromagnetic terrain and objects, and therefore battlefields and targets, cannot
exist without human intervention and creation. Electromagnetism is a force of physics, and
while many tools exist which make use of and manipulate the electromagnetic spectrum, it is not
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possible for an environment to exist as a subset of a force. If it were, we would have to consider
gravity as an environment.
Similarly, information is not an environment—information is a noun, a thing.
Electromagnetic representations of information may reside within a man-made environment, but
it cannot be an environment in and of itself. Information can be the objective of an attack
(stealing, denying access to, corrupting, etc.), but is not itself the field over which the attack
traveled to its objective. Dominion cannot be contested over information; only the machines and
infrastructure it resides upon and travels through. The DoD tries to sort this out by giving the
“information environment” its own definition: “The aggregate of individuals, organizations, and
systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.” [76] But this definition singles
out the entities of an information environment as individual and separate, whereas an
environment should be a contiguous, all-encompassing thing. It gives no mention to the manmade infrastructure which ties it all together, interconnectedness being one of the necessary
trademarks of cyberspace. Additionally, cyberspace would not be able to map directly to this
“information environment” because human beings and organizations are included within it.
Dominion may not be contested in cyberspace over individuals or organizations; only systems,
and even then only systems of machines.
Some will no doubt be asking “If that’s the case, then what environment encompasses the
cyberspace domain?” It is the author’s opinion that cyberspace is not natural but is manmade…call it machine.
…while the physical characteristics of cyberspace can be delineated and come from
forces that exist naturally in the physical world, in a very real sense cyberspace is a
designed environment, created with the very specific intent of facilitating the use and
exploitation of information, human interaction and intercommunication.
-Dr. Dan Kuehl, National Defense University
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The machine environment was not always possible. It was only through the
interconnectedness and “awareness” of machines to their electromagnetic networks and the
systems they were connected to that it became possible. Notice I said “awareness” and not “selfawareness,” although this too may likely become possible in time. It is an important distinction
to make – once machines can think for themselves, it may no longer be an environment we can
control. The world of SkyNet in the Terminator movies may sound like science fiction, but then
so did most modern technologies in times past. [52] Modern computers and micro-processors are
unique in the fact that they can be either tools or a component of the machine environment, or
even both at the same time. When disconnected from a network, a computer is a tool; you can
use it for word processing, doing sums, etc. When plugged
into a network, it instantly becomes part of the machine
environmental landscape and can threaten your interests as
easily as it can help them. This holds true for any
computerized machine connected to a network. For
example: an unmanned aerial vehicle, a communications
satellite, or even a cellular telephone is also part of the
machine landscape. In a traditional sense, these devices

Figure 2 - The Machine Environment
(Cyberspace). [87]

are targets—such as a tank or a command and control facility. But these devices are also terrain
that is contested—we strive to protect and defend our cyberspace assets in the same way that
ground and naval forces seize and hold key terrain and choke points.

Once again turning to

science fiction for an example, we see that the humans of Battlestar Galactica are wary to the
extreme of networking any computer in the fear that the Cylons will then be able to use their
once-tools against them. [49]
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Although computers are electronic machines which make use of the electromagnetic
spectrum, there are other types in development which are not, particularly in the nano and biomechanics fields. Rest assured that these new kinds of machines will also be somehow linked
into the machine environment in order to facilitate remote control and increase usefulness.
This constant move towards ever-expanding amounts of control and utility is one of the
trademarks of cyber development; operations within and dependence upon cyberspace have
steadily grown over the years since 1969. However, as the cyberspace domain has increasingly
become a contested territory, it is being made clear that the capacity for defense has not kept
pace with the capacity to attack. It is only recently that we have seriously begun to treat
cyberspace as a warfighting domain. In keeping with the previous discussions on air and space,
this will include developing cyberspace operations theory and doctrine (who is the cyberequivalent to Billy Mitchell?), as well as organizing, training and equipping a cyber force.
Hopefully we can make serious progress in these areas before our increasingly cyber-dependent
national interests are threatened with an electronic “Pearl Harbor” attack with strategic
consequences. The cyber attacks on Estonia in April and May of 2007 in which 20,000 networks
of compromised computers were linked up to cripple the country’s financial and governmental
offices and the well-coordinated Russian recruitment of an international cyber-militia to attack
Georgia in 2008 were but a very small taste of such a surprise attack. [43, 36] Distributed Denial
of Service (DDoS) attacks and web defacements as were seen in Estonia, the more sophisticated
yet still non-destructive web server attacks that were seen in Georgia, or disruptions caused by
virus replication as was seen with the Code Red, Blaster, and Slammer variants in 2001 and 2003
are nothing compared to the widespread and debilitating damage that would be caused by a virus
with a destructive payload.
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As with the air domain, other countries are moving ahead in developing capabilities for
exploiting and controlling the machine environment. Cyberspace is clearly a domain in which the
US (and the rest of the Western world) has peer and near-peer competitors. [15] Chinese military
thinkers have specifically begun theorizing and developing doctrine for integrating cyber warfare
capabilities with other elements of national power, as evidenced by the concept of
“informationization” (xinxihua) put forward in China’s 2006 white paper on national defense.
[30] Foreign ideas, strategies, and doctrine are in advance of our own in large part because our
top officials in the Army, Navy, and Air Force are thinking in terms of the past, most
comfortable with doing things the way they’ve always been done. [8] If there is one thing history
has taught us, it is that our armed forces are slow to change. Compounding this fact are
budgetary concerns in Congress: if they do not see a clear and present danger, they may not wish
to spend billions of dollars as a response to an unspecified, vague threat. Just as in the time of
Billy Mitchell, it might take an astonishing demonstration, a Cyber “sinking of the Ostfriesland”
to prove that the juggernauts of the 21st century are, as General Mitchell put it, “as helpless as
was once the proud armored knight on horseback when gunfire first was brought against him”
[44] in regards to cyber operations. One would think that an exercise consisting of a no-holdsbarred unleashing of cyber capabilities against our nation’s infrastructure would jolt the nation’s
leaders into action. However, in 1997 and again in 2003, the Department of Defense-run Operation
Eligible Receiver – an effort to test the vulnerability of this nation to electronic attack – failed to
catch the attention of Congress. According to an account published in the Washington Times,
“Senior Pentagon leaders were stunned by a military exercise showing how easy it is for hackers to
cripple U.S. military and civilian computer networks.” [48] In a few days and using only
commercial-off-the-shelf computer equipment, the red team hackers had infiltrated the computer
systems controlling parts of the nation’s electric power grid and with a series of commands could
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have turned sections of the country dark. “If the exercise had been real,” the Christian Science
Monitor reported, “they could have disrupted the Department of Defense’s communication systems
(taking out most of the Pacific Command) and gained access to computer systems aboard U.S. Navy
vessels.” [48] Sadly, a demonstration on a financial institution may have been a better showcase,

as threats to the nation’s pocketbook seem to generate more dismay than threats to the nation’s
military that could be alleviated by more defense spending.
The difficulties with advancing the cause of cyberspace and cyber power are similar to
those experienced in the early 1900’s: cyberspace is largely seen as a supporting domain for
other missions, and we have not had a well-defined career path for developing cyberspace
professionals, to include appropriate leadership positions—at least not to the same extent as we
develop air and space leaders. As to the first point, it is clear that each service is concerned with
protecting its own portion of cyberspace—because they have to protect their ability to operate in
their primary domains. Each service has begun efforts to formally develop cyberspace
capabilities. In 2006, the Air Force embarked on a plan to create a new major command
specifically for organizing, training and equipping a cyber force. In a “Go-Do” letter to 8th Air
Force Commander, then-Chief of Staff of the Air Force General T. Michael Moseley wrote that
his intent was to “redefine airpower by extending the Air Force’s global vigilance, global reach,
and global power into the cyberspace domain” by directing Eighth Air Force “to leverage,
consolidate, and integrate Air Force unique cyberspace capabilities and functions… across the
spectrum of conflict.” [50] A provisional command, AFCYBER(P), was subsequently activated
in 2007, with a permanent major command activating in October 2008. The mission of
AFCYBER was to “provide combat-ready forces trained and equipped to conduct sustained
combat operations in and through the electromagnetic spectrum, fully integrated with air and
space operations.” [67] Major General William T. Lord, AFCYBER(P) Commander, stated
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“Controlling cyberspace is the prerequisite to effective operations across all strategic and
operational domains—securing freedom from attack and freedom to attack.” [67] The Air Force
has since backed off on creating a separate major command for cyberspace, and has decided to
create a cyber-focused numbered air force under Air Force Space Command. This move does
not mean that cyberspace is no longer viewed as important, but rather reflects fiscal and resource
constraints.
A common theme in the quoted statements above is that the Air Force seems to be—to
paraphrase Billy Mitchell’s words—“thinking first of airplanes, and making cybercraft
secondary to that.” The Army and Navy are also developing their own cyberspace capabilities,
and their activities will no doubt be focused on their primary domains (land and sea) and how
cyberspace supports them. This is only natural and expected, since the development of
cyberspace specific capabilities will be competing for scarce resources against existing
warfighting requirements.
A natural question, however, is who in the DoD is (or should be) looking specifically at
warfighting in the cyberspace domain and defense of the nation in cyberspace, to include
government, private sector, and academia. It is the author’s contention that cyberspace will
likely not receive the level of attention and advocacy it needs until a new service is created
specifically for the domain—because the existing services will be focused on their primary
domains. Unfortunately, it may take a significant event (equivalent to launch of the Sputnik or
sinking of the Ostfriesland) to galvanize activities. The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity
Initiative (CNCI) released in early 2008 and ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review will no doubt
be focusing on such issues.
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To summarize, cyberspace has overtaken space and is now a warfighting domain in every
sense. Hundreds of thousands of probes and attacks occur in cyberspace every day. Space is
largely demilitarized (for various reasons) and is similar to the “observation balloon” stage of air
exploitation, whereas cyberspace has advanced to the “WWI prop fighter” and Interwar period,
with another Pearl Harbor looming over any unwary nation. Dominion is being contested on a
daily basis. The United States needs to formulate the strategy, the doctrine, and the force to
protect our cyber homeland while working towards the “cyber advanced multi-role stealth
fighter-bombers” before another country develops a “cyber nuclear bomb.”
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III. The Nature of Power and Dominion
What is (Military) Power?
War is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means.
-Carl von Clausewitz
The strategist is he who always keeps the objective of the war in sight and the objective of
the war is never military and is always political.
-Alfred Thayer Mahan
Over the centuries, all civilizations have attempted to utilize force of arms in order to
afford themselves more power relative to various other external entities. The reasons for this are
many and complex, but the National Military Strategy for the United States distills them down to
just three: protect the nation against external attacks and aggression, prevent conflict and surprise
attack, and prevail against adversaries. [79] Each branch of the military is then responsible for
organizing, training, and equipping forces to Combatant Commanders (warfighters). It is left to
the individual services to formulate the means of generating power in their individual domain
given the tools that are available to them and then applying that power (with the additional input
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the direction of the Combatant Commanders) to affect an
adversary’s centers of gravity (more on these in a bit). The relevant entries in MerriamWebster’s dictionary define power thusly:
POW•ER \ n
1. ability to act or produce an effect.
2. possession of control, authority, or influence over others.
3. physical might. [59]
Indeed, the military’s overarching goal is to gain and maintain its ability to act or produce effects
through physical (kinetic) and non-physical methods in order to exert control and influence over
others. But where do nations derive this power, and how should this power be applied for
maximal effect to cause capitulation to your demands? The answer to the first question has been
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put forth by the formulation of the Instruments of National Power, which are commonly accepted
to be Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic (DIME), but have been recently
expanded to include financial systems, intelligence, and law enforcement (DIMEFIL). [27] The
focus of this research is on the Military instrument (to include cyber), although it may well touch
upon other instruments where they overlap (most notably the Informational, Economic,
Financial, and Intelligence instruments). The answer to the second question—how should power
be applied?—has been studied extensively by military theorists, among them Carl von
Clausewitz, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and John Warden. A common theme discussed throughout
the literature is the concept of “Center of Gravity” (CoG). [12]
Clausewitz defined a center of gravity as “the hub of all power and movement, on which
everything depends.” [12] Modern US military doctrine has redefined centers of gravity as
“those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its
freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight” [62], as those “characteristics, capabilities
or locations from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will
to fight” [75], and yet again and most recently as “a source of power that provides moral or
physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.” [78] Reasons for these frequent changes and
re-definitions can perhaps be traced to a bad translation from the original German within the
most popular edition of Clausewitz’s book, On War. Theorists have gone back to the original
texts and noted that Clausewitz never used the word “source,” (quelle, in German) and that he
was very enamored of the science of physics at the time of his writings. A Clausewitzian CoG is
not a strength, nor is it a source of strength. Most likely to him, a center of gravity was the one
element within a object’s entire structure or system that had the necessary centripetal force to
hold that structure together. Additionally, because Clausewitz’s CoG focuses on achieving a
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specific effect, the collapse of the enemy, it is an effects-based approach rather than a
capabilities-based one and it resembles the concept of Effects-Based Operations (EBO). [25]
Furthermore, Clausewitz advocated attacking these centers of gravity with all the force
possible. Some of his thoughts are summarized as follows: “war is an act of force, and there is
no logical limit to the application of that force,” “the grand objective in all military action is to
overthrow the enemy,” and “destruction of the enemy is what always matters most.” [12] This
idea of centers of gravity and absolute war is very important to cyber power. Attacking targets in
cyberspace does not necessarily kill people, although indirect 2nd and 3rd order effects may
certainly result in physical destruction and loss of life. Nor will cyber attacks occupy and hold
territory (at least in a physical sense). Using Clausewitz’ ideas, it would seem that cyber power
would be brought to bear on one or more of the few centers of gravity that can be reached via
cyberspace (e.g., financial; economic; and informational CoGs) with all possible effort. Further,
the attacker must be prepared to detrimentally affect every living human being in the target
country. As General Lord has stated, cyber power when used to win wars may be a weapon of
mass disruption. [11] If any lesser effect than total collapse is desired (i.e., Clausewitz’ concept
of a “limited war” or “war with limited aims”), cyber power may play a mere supporting role to
attacks in the other domains. The 2007 report Flying and Fighting in Cyberspace backs this
assertion:
Cyber capabilities can assuredly support applications of other force capabilities, but,
fundamentally, they are not the destructive, kinetic purveyors of violence that war
fighters traditionally envision in planning military strategy, engagements and wars. If we
apply them as primary weapons of war, then basic concepts regarding the use of force or
threat of force to compel the enemy must change. [13]
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Adding more challenge than just the small number of possible categories from which to
choose centers of gravity in cyberspace is the fact that conditions must be just right for a country
to have any of them at all. For example, an informational CoG may be more meaningful in a
country ripe for coup, revolution, or collapse due to shattering of ideologies or propaganda.
Likewise, economic and financial CoG’s do not exist except for countries or entities that rely
heavily on cyberspace and are highly dependent upon a capitalistic-style economic furnace or
organizations that require movement of
Table 1 - Actor Center of Gravity Dependence

funds through numbered bank accounts.
This is illustrated in the chart at left,
in which certain actors are more reliant
upon certain cyber CoGs than others. For
example, in a capitalistic superpower such
as the United States, an attack on financial
and economic CoGs could have a great
effect, whereas an informational attack
would be shrugged off. Disinformation,
psychological operations, or propaganda
may cause a certain amount of distrust, but
would probably not cause an insurrection or
coup, the government having a long history of providing for its people. In a more authoritarian
society, the informational CoG gains more importance. For example, the People’s Republic of
China has an extensive Internet censorship program to restrict the flow of information among its
citizens to those topics that have been deemed “acceptable” by national leaders.
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On the other

hand, the economic CoG may lose some importance because China is largely an
industrial/agricultural country that can produce many of its own goods, and its financial CoG
also loses some importance because in a communist society laborers will work “for the good of
the people” with little or no compensation. Lastly, in a terrorist organization, the financial CoG
has moderate importance. Funds from numbered bank accounts are disbursed to finance terrorist
cells in many diverse countries. However, Al Qaeda would still be able to carry out limited
attacks with no funds, as it also uses religious extremism to garner operatives to its banner. The
economic CoG has no bearing on a terrorist organization because they do not trade with anyone
or produce anything, but the informational CoG is highly important because it is through
ideology and propaganda that they derive their power.
Along with the relative importance of Cyber CoGs to individual actors, another chart can
be used to estimate the effects of an absolute war in cyberspace. This chart shows the relative
damage that could be caused

Table 2 - Asymmetric Effects of Cyber Warfare

based upon a target’s reliance
on cyberspace. Many third
world countries have little or
no reliance on cyberspace,
and therefore a cyber attack
on them would have
negligible effect. Countries
like China, Russia, and India
have small pockets of
advanced information
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technology, but large percentages (91.5% in the case of China) of their very large populations are
in rural areas with very limited access to (or need for) cyberspace. [60] An attack on a cyber
CoG in countries such as those would cause disruption, but ultimately might not create enough
damage to the nation as a whole to cause capitulation. Finally, highly advanced—i.e., “wired”—
countries such as the United States, Estonia, and Taiwan, are almost totally reliant on
cyberspace, and as such attacking a cyber CoG of great importance would almost certainly cause
a great amount of disruption, as was seen with the example of Estonia in 2005.
Putting the two charts together, we can see that attacking a cyber CoG of great
importance in a country with high reliance on cyberspace could create a debilitating effect.
Attacking a cyber CoG of moderate importance to a country would cause an effect that was one
step lower than on the “Effects of Cyber Warfare” scale, and attacking a CoG of little to no
importance would create an effect two steps lower. It is interesting to note that this graph also
depicts the relative asymmetry of cyber attacks. A third world country could attack an extremely
advanced nation, yet any tit-for-tat reprisals have limited utility. Additionally, one can also think
of these relative orders of magnitude in terms of cost of infrastructure, maintenance, technicians,
research and development, engineers and scientists required to effectively operate and provide
for defense in cyberspace. For example, North Korea’s investments in establishing and
defending its cyberspace infrastructure are much less than those required by, say, Taiwan. This
does not hold true for an attack capability, as this capability can come very cheaply in the form
of inexpensive second-hand laptops and downloaded script-kiddy attacks.
In order to effectively attack and destroy centers of gravity, modern war planners and
strategy theorists generally recognize nine principles of war which apply (although not equally)
to all domains of warfare. These principles have grown out of and been influenced by all the
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great military thinkers, but most influential among them is Clausewitz. Many of these principles
are included in his seminal work, On War, as incontrovertible points of strategy. Examples are
boldness, perseverance, superiority of numbers, surprise, cunning, concentration of forces in
space, unification of forces in time, strategic reserve, and economy of force. [12] The U.S. Army
adapted these principles and published them in their “Operations” field manual (FM 3-0) as the
Principles of War: objective, offensive, economy of force, mass, maneuver, unity of command,
simplicity, surprise, and security. [69]
•

Objective is described as “direct[ing] every military operation toward a clearly
defined, decisive, and attainable objective.” [69] While not explicitly defined in
Clausewitz’s points on strategy, objective is a strong thread that runs through his
writings in regards to centers of gravity, which he believed of utmost importance to
the winning of wars. [12]

•

Offensive means to “seize, retain, and exploit the initiative,” and is synonymous with
boldness. [69]

•

Economy of Force is taken unchanged, and is defined by the Army as “allocat[ing]
minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.” [69]

•

Mass means to “concentrate the effects of combat power at the decisive place and
time,” and correlates with Clausewitz’ principle of concentration of forces in space
and unification of forces in time. [69]

•

Maneuver means to “place the enemy in a disadvantageous position through the
flexible application of combat power,” [69] and while not one of Clausewitz’s points
of strategy, he did think it important enough to get its own chapter later in his book.
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•

Unity of Command is the belief that an army should, “for every objective, ensure
unity of effort under one responsible commander.” [69] This point was also not
explicitly addressed by Clausewitz, although there are undercurrents of this idea
throughout his writings.

•

Simplicity is explained as “prepar[ing] clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise
orders to ensure thorough understanding.” [69] Again, this was not part of
Clausewitz’s strategic points, but it is a theme which recurs quite frequently
throughout the rest of his writings: “everything in war is very simple, but the simplest
thing is difficult.” [12]

•

Surprise is to “strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is
unprepared,” [69] and remains unchanged from Clausewitz’s original point.

•

And finally, security is to “never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected
advantage,” [69] which maps directly to Clausewitz’s “cunning” point of strategy.

We see that of Clausewitz’s nine original points, the Army kept six of them
(consolidating two into one in one case), and added four not specifically mentioned in
Clausewitz’s “On Strategy in General” chapter but were nonetheless important themes
throughout the rest of his work. Three strategic points dropped by the Army (perseverance,
superiority of numbers, and strategic reserve) were deemed as either going without saying (as in
the case of perseverance and strategic reserve), or outmoded by technology (superiority of
numbers). While these are the widely accepted principles, some of the ways that each branch of
service goes about practicing them necessarily differ quite widely based upon the specialized
environments in which they operate. Additionally, some principles may have more importance
in a certain domain and less in another. Let us now look at each domain individually.
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Theories of Military Power
When conversing about military power, there are certain individuals whose names spring
to mind and who are generally regarded as the subject matter experts in relation to the domains
they studied. For the land, environment, the writings of Sun Tzu, Antoine-Henri Jomini, and
Carl von Clausewitz are prominent. For contests at Sea, Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian S.
Corbett were the visionaries whose writings still greatly influence our navy today. As discussed
earlier, Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell were the leading pioneers of the air domain, followed
more recently by people like John Boyd and John Warden. There have been some attempts to
codify doctrine and space power theory such as David E. Lupton’s 1998 work On Space
Warfare, but as has been discussed earlier, the non-militarization of space has limited space as
more of a supporting environment rather than a warfighting domain. Given the embryonic state
of cyberspace as a warfighting domain, there are no real Billy Mitchells, but this will change as
we learn more about applying power to achieve effects in the domain. Cyber power can be
related to power in each of the other domains by varying degrees, as will be discussed in the
following sections.
Power on Land
[Y]ou may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it
clean of life—but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you
must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men
into the mud.
-T. R. Fehrenbach [69]
Land warfare is the oldest and perhaps most understood of all the fighting disciplines;
however, it is also the least analogous to cyber power. Terrain and weather don’t matter,
maneuver is somewhat meaningless, and a direct approach works better than an indirect. The
one way in which cyber power does resemble power on land concerns its use to influence a
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nation’s center of gravity. Over the centuries, certain technological advances have altered
aspects of military power on land, but the basic concepts remain the same. Sun Tzu was the first
military theorist whose written works survived through the ages. In his book The Art of War,
written in China 2,500 years ago, he wrote very generally about the derivation and grand strategy
of land power, stating only that “War is a matter of vital importance to the state; the province of
life or death; the road to survival or ruin.” [62] When describing importance of targets (Sun
Tzu’s centers of gravity) and how power should be applied to these targets, he wrote: “…The
best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this. To capture the enemy’s army is
better than to destroy it… to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill. Thus... of
supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy; the next best is to disrupt his
alliances; the next best is to attack his army; and the worst policy is to attack cities.” [62] What
Sun Tzu did write extensively about was doctrine and tactics – the employment of land power.
According to him, there are five fundamental factors which shape power on land. Those are:
moral influence, weather, terrain, command, and doctrine (do not confuse the modern definition
of this word with Sun Tzu’s use of it).
•

Moral influence: Sun Tzu was speaking of the extent to which the people of a nation
or army were in harmony with its leadership; the will to fight. [62] This is important
to any conflict, including those in cyberspace. However, it is less important on the
digital battlefield as there is a greater willingness to press a button or type a few
keystrokes than there is to place yourself bodily into the line of fire to be killed or
maimed. This extends to a nations populace; the United States would be more likely
to engage in a cyber war, as it bears no immediate (physical) risk to the nation’s sons
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and daughters (although the saying “those who live in glass houses shouldn’t throw
stones” comes to mind).
•

Weather: By this, Sun Tzu meant that the natural forces of snow, rain, heat, etc.,
would greatly affect the power which could be brought to bear in combat. [62] In
those days, such things could easily kill or wear down a large percentage of your
army in the field before ever engaging with the enemy. In terms of cyberspace,
weather is much less a factor than in other domains. With the exceptions of a
lightning strike taking out a critical router, rain shorting out a badly insulated wire, or
adverse environmental conditions such as sun spots or atmospheric scatter due to
cloud cover affecting satellite or radio frequency propagation, the weather plays a
very small role in cyberspace operations.

•

Terrain: Sun Tzu included distance, ease of traversal, favorability of maneuver, and
inhospitable features into this category. [62] Again, this is a factor which bears
limited corollaries to the cyber landscape. Although there are network topologies to
consider when planning both attacks and defenses, travel to critical nodes is not
influenced by features of the cyber landscape. Distance is traversed in milliseconds at
near the speed of light, propagation of signals occurs just as well (or well enough as
to make no difference) along their path, and maneuver is somewhat meaningless (as a
signal will travel to an enemy’s fixed IP along any path available) except in making
attribution more difficult.

•

Command: Sun Tzu meant the qualities of leadership including wisdom, sincerity,
humanity, courage, and strictness. [62] Leadership is a factor influencing power in all
domains. In cyberspace just as on the ground, bad leaders will not recognize
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changing circumstances and act expediently, nor will they encourage creativity or
ingenuity of troops, and they will also not seize opportunities when they arise. It is
leadership who assumes the risk in decisions of defense and attack.
•

Doctrine: By this he meant organization, control, assignment of appropriate ranks to
officers, regulation of supply routes, and the provision of principle items used by the
army. [62] These matters certainly have bearing in cyberspace, but the term as
defined by Sun Tzu is much too broad and general in nature to attempt to draw
relationships to cyber power.

If Sun Tzu is the embodiment of the Eastern military philosophy of unlimited warfare and
winning without fighting, then Carl von Clausewitz is the embodiment of Western military
philosophy and usage of force against a certain defined selection of targets. Carl von Clausewitz
was a Prussian soldier and strategic thinker who lived during the 18th and 19th centuries and who
further defined and refined Sun Tzu’s work with experiences of his own some 2,300 years later.
That no other definitive work had been written on the subject in 23 centuries attests to the
strength of Sun Tzu’s ideas, but differing Western viewpoints and advances in technology had
finally called for a reworking of his tried and true ideas. Clausewitz spoke much more definitely
about the derivation and grand strategy of power on land. He recognized and defined war as “an
act of force to compel our enemy to do our will,” and “nothing but the continuation of policy
with other means,” with the aim being the disarmament of the enemy, for “so long as I have not
overthrown my opponent, I am bound to fear he may overthrow me. Thus I am not in control: he
dictates to me as much as I dictate to him.” [12] Besides advocating that the maximum use of
force be brought to bear against certain targets which he termed centers of gravity (discussed
previously), Clausewitz also wrote about five elements of land strategy which were analogous to
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Sun Tzu’s five fundamental factors. His were moral, physical, mathematical, geographical, and
statistical. [12] The first, moral, exactly relates to Sun Tzu’s first factor of moral influence. [12]
Obviously, the moral imperative is quite a strong influence over relative power if it made it into
Clausewitz’s list unchanged. Secondly, the physical element “consists of the size of the armed
forces, their composition, armament and so forth.” [12] This is a new addition, as Sun Tzu took
for granted an army strength of “1,000 fast four-horse chariots, 1,000 four-horse wagons covered
in leather, and 100,000 mailed troops,” [62] while Clausewitz took into account the fact that
combat operations in his day could take place between much smaller forces, and that there could
be several autonomous armies with different objectives to achieve on different battlefields. [12]
Third, the mathematical element “includes the angle of lines of operation, the convergent and
divergent movements wherever geometry enters into their calculation.” [12] This can be loosely
related to Sun Tzu’s command factor; while not exactly what he would have meant by the term,
it is leadership who formulates and chooses the best mathematical approach for the campaign.
Fourth, the geographical element “comprises the influence of terrain, such as commanding
positions, mountains, rivers, woods, and roads.” [12] This directly relates to Sun Tzu’s third
factor, terrain. Although we see that technology had advanced far enough to make weather less
of a factor in ground warfare, terrain (geography) still made it into Clausewitz’s list (at the time
of his writings, cavalry had still not been replaced by mechanized units). And lastly, the
statistical element which “covers support and maintenance,” [12] directly relates to Sun Tzu’s
“doctrine” factor.

49

With cyber power, the moral imperative still carries weight. It might be easier to decide
about ruining a country’s finances because nobody is killed in the attack, but this does not mean
that we should. Likewise, the physical element has bearing because, while much smaller in
numbers than a traditional army, a “cyber army” must still be comprised of highly skilled and
knowledgeable individuals with cutting-edge tools. The mathematical element plays a large role
in cyber operations, because knowing what and how you will affect other, related entities based
upon your target selection is key to neutralizing centers of gravity without excessive collateral
damage. The fourth, geographical, has no bearing upon cyberspace – for reasons mentioned
previously – but also largely because IPs are logical and static. Therefore, the router being
attacked may as well be in the next room as in China for all the difference it makes (EW being
the exception) and the fifth, statistical, has very little bearing; a little office space and a few
computers deep within friendly territory is all that is needed (again barring EW) to run a highly
effective cyber force.
The modern United States Army has seen fit to
once again reformulate the five elements of land strategy
and dubbed them “elements of combat power.” These
are: maneuver, firepower, leadership, protection, and
information. [69] Maneuver directly correlates to
Clausewitz’s mathematical element, as both concern the
geometric movements of units around a battlefield. FM
3-0 defines it as “the employment of forces, through
Figure 3 - Fundamentals of Full Spectrum
Operations. [33]

movement combined with fire or fire potential, to
achieve a position of advantage with respect to the
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enemy to accomplish the mission.” [69] In network operations however, there are no positions of
advantage. Operations occur from fixed IPs and travel along a series of known routes to their
ultimate destination (note again that positions of advantage may manifest in Electronic Warfare
(EW) however, as this field is more akin to “traditional” kinetic warfare). The second element,
firepower, relates to the physical element. [69] The change in word choice definitely reflects the
modern assumption that greater numbers do not necessarily compensate for greater technology.
Indeed, the U.S. is outnumbered in most of the wars it engages in. The disparity is made up by
technologies, which are dubbed “force multipliers.” The Army defines firepower as “the amount
of fires that a position, unit, or weapons system can deliver,” with fires being “the effects of
lethal and nonlethal weapons.” [69] Firepower is also important to cyber operations, and can be
viewed as the potential amount of destruction that a cyber attack (computer network attack or
electronic warfare) can cause. Note that this does NOT refer to numbers. A botnet of 100,000
machines used for a DOS attack would have a very low firepower since they are just sending
network requests (e.g., to a web server), rather than using malicious or destructive logic.
However, the botnet WOULD be using the principle of mass to achieve greater effect. FM 3-0
also goes on to say that “firepower magnifies the effects of maneuver by destroying enemy
forces and restricting his ability to counter friendly actions; maneuver creates the conditions for
the effective use of firepower.” [69] This statement is not true in cyberspace, for in the machine
environment conditions are always ripe to make effective use of firepower. If you have the
enemy IP, you may “fire” at it at will. The next element of combat power is leadership:
Because it deals directly with soldiers, leadership is the most dynamic element of combat
power. Confident, audacious, and competent leadership focuses the other elements of
combat power and serves as the catalyst that creates conditions for success. Leaders who
embody the warrior ethos inspire soldiers to succeed. They provide purpose, direction,
and motivation in all operations. Leadership is key, and the actions of leaders often
make the difference between success and failure, particularly in small units. [69]
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While this is definitely true for any team to be successful, certain aspects of traditional leadership
do perhaps take on a role of somewhat lesser importance or are deemphasized in a cyber force.
Without the threat of imminent bodily harm, a dashing and courageous leader is not required to
inspire the men to plunge once more into the breach, go over the top, or take the hill. A cyber
leader should be analytical, intelligent, logical, decisive, and able to visualize complex
interrelationships.
The geographical strategic element has been dropped from the list because technology
has mostly (but not altogether) overcome the disadvantages inherent in or afforded by one terrain
over another. Mechanized infantry, armor, and artillery divisions have replaced foot-soldiers,
horse cavalry, and cannon. The omission of geography works just as well for cyberspace, as we
have discussed the uniformity of terrain previously. Surprisingly, the statistical element has also
been dropped from the elements of combat power. This is puzzling, as supply lines have always
played a huge role in sustaining combat power on land since the dawn of time and continue to do
so. Perhaps because of our increasingly globalized environment, the Army may be taking too
much for granted about the superiority of modern logistics to supply their war machine across
the world. The statistical element can, however, be successfully removed from cyber power as
all that is required is a relatively small office space and a few computers far behind friendly
lines. In place of these two deletions, the Army added two new ones. The first is a protection
element, which is defined as “preservation of the fighting potential of a force so the commander
can apply maximum force at the decisive time and place… Protection has four components:
force protection, field discipline, safety, and fratricide avoidance.” [69] All four of these
components have corollaries within cyber operations to either a greater or lesser extent, with the
first being by far the most important. Although cyber warfare favors the offense, defense from
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attack and protection of your infrastructure is also of extreme importance as certain portions of
the cyber environmental landscape are also the CoGs the enemy is attacking. The other three
components, while important, carry lesser weight in cyber operations; there are few kinetic
weapons to accidentally discharge, the work mainly takes place in an office environment, and
operators are unlikely to accidentally hack a friendly server or launch a malicious logic attack on
a friendly IP (although destroying an enemy asset that another friendly entity wished to remain
operational is still a concern). The second new element is information, which is described as
something that “enhances leadership and magnifies the effects of maneuver, firepower, and
protection.” [69] The text goes on to describe the information element in greater detail:
The common operational picture (COP) based on enhanced intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR) and disseminated by modern information systems provides
commanders throughout the force with an accurate, near real-time perspective and
knowledge of the situation. Information from the COP, transformed into situational
understanding, allows commanders to combine the elements of combat power in new
ways. For example, superior understanding of the situation allows commanders to avoid
enemy engagement areas, while concentrating fires and maneuver at the decisive place
and time. [69]
The informational element is likewise extremely important to cyber operations, and for the same
reasons. Superior knowledge of enemy cyber infrastructure, capability, and defenses are
invaluable to planning effective attacks at the proper place and time. Furthermore, it is
cyberspace itself that enables ISR and a COP to be developed in the first place.
As we have seen, power on land is primarily about bending an opponent to your will.
Sun Tzu advocated winning wars without fighting. Clausewitz said that warfare was essentially
a political act and that wars would be one by focusing on the enemy’s centers of gravity with all
possible force. While Sun Tzu exercised any means necessary to secure victory (i.e., unrestricted
warfare), Clausewitz wrote that diplomacy and spying were better left to political leaders, not
military ones. [12] Even though the teachings of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz may differ, lessons can
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still be learned and applied from both of them. East versus West viewpoints towards warfare
still exist to this day, with China generally following Sun Tzu [31, 81] (and doing quite well at
engaging the United States economically) [39], while the United States follows Clausewitz and
seeks to win wars by destroying a nation’s will to fight. Power at sea, on the other hand, is quite
different.
Power at Sea
The profound influence of sea commerce upon the wealth and strength of countries was
clearly seen long before the principles which governed its growth and prosperity were
detected… wars arising from other causes have been greatly modified in their conduct
and issue by the control of the sea.
- Alfred Thayer Mahan
The above quote is startling in its obvious similarities to cyberspace. In fact, if cyber
warfare bears the least resemblance to land warfare, it appears to most resemble warfare at sea.
In Mahan’s quote above, changing “sea commerce” to “e-commerce” and replacing the words
“the sea” with “cyberspace”, one sees natural parallels between the maritime domain and
cyberspace. Mahan was perhaps the greatest thinker in naval strategy and doctrine. One might
say that Mahan is to sea power as Clausewitz is to land warfare. Mahan’s influence on the
development and application of US naval power are quite evident, and naval doctrine did not
really change much until 1992 with the publication From the Sea, which marked a shift in
thought from blue water operations to power projection and control of the littoral regions.
Mahan characterized the maritime domain thusly:
The first and most obvious light in which the sea presents itself from the political and
social point of view is that of a great highway; or better, perhaps, of a wide common,
over which men may pass in all directions, but on which some well-worn paths show that
controlling reasons have led them to choose certain lines of travel rather than others.
These lines of travel are called trade routes; and the reasons which have determined
them are to be sought in the history of the world. [42]
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Again, it is easy to see the parallels with cyberspace. Cyberspace is all about
connectivity. The internet refers to the globally interconnected network of smaller networks. It
includes everyday users at the individual level, business networks, college campuses, and
government enclaves. These networks are linked through physical and logical connections.
Users connect to cyberspace using fixed (i.e., wired and fiber optic gateways) or mobile
(wireless) access points and and “navigate” through cyberspace using the World Wide Web and
other virtual protocols. Cyberspace is structured in that there are technical, international, and
legal standards for activity, but it also has an unstructured “high seas” nature of how people use
the domain. The relative anonymity of the internet allows for malicious behavior without fear of
being caught, prosecuted, or otherwise countered. The use of the term “pirate” to describe those
who people who use the internet for illegitimate purposes certainly reinforces the parallelism
between the two domains. It is difficult—even with advanced technology—to counter a small
gang of sea pirates who use guerrilla tactics, much in the same way it is difficult to track down
hacker groups and people who are illegally distributing intellectual property.
Another interesting parallel between the two domains is that both have lines of
communication (LOCs). Navies were established primarily to combat piracy and protect
commerce. Mahan believed that a fleet of warships was required to establish control of the sea
by destroying an adversary’s capital ships and then enforcing a blockade to starve him to
capitulation. The blockade could be implemented by closing the enemy’s ports and interdicting
the flow of commerce and goods on the high seas. Because of the geographic scope involved, it
is easier to instead control the choke points through which the LOCs flow; for example, to
restrict traffic flow into and out of the Mediterranean, one could simply seize and control the
Strait of Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, and the Bosporus strait. Cyberspace offers similar lines of
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communication, as shown in Figures 22-24. As we can see, these network maps look strikingly
like shipping lanes. Disrupting the flow of information in cyberspace (i.e., a digital blockade)
could be achieved through direct action against the nodes (ports) or the LOCs (communications

Figure 4 - The Well-Worn Paths of Cyberspace – Undersea Cables. [88]

links) using kinetic strikes, computer network attack, and electronic warfare, or some
combination of the three. Navy doctrine stresses the importance of these lanes and ports and the
danger of allowing uncontested access to them as follows:
Because we are a maritime nation, our security strategy is necessarily a transoceanic
one. Our vital interests—those interests for which the United States is willing to fight—
are at the endpoint of “highways of the seas” or lines of strategic approach that stretch
from the United States to the farthest point on the globe. [14]
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This holds just as true in cyberspace, and perhaps even more so. At the end of shipping lanes are
ports, but destruction of these ports does not affect the sea domain itself, just the ability to
exploit the sea using that port. In cyberspace, the devices that make up the “ports” also make
cyberspace what it is. Shutting off a network router or web server in essence degrades (if not
destroys) that particular portion of cyberspace. Centers of Gravity may be connected directly to
these paths, and their destruction could result in actual removal of areas of the domain, and

Figure 5 - The Well-Worn Paths of Cyberspace - Internet Backbones (not all-inclusive). [89]

significant harm to the nation. In other words, destroying a country’s ports—whether sea ports
or cyberspace nodes—is a means to an end (e.g., surrender or remain neutral). A difference
between the two domains is that actions in cyberspace may very well change the “terrain” of
cyberspace. Regarding planning and conduct of naval operations, Mahan wrote the following
(with comments inserted to highlight application to cyberspace):
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Before hostile armies or fleets [cyber forces] are brought into contact (a word which
perhaps better than any other indicates the dividing line between tactics and strategy),
there are a number of questions to be decided, covering the whole plan of operations
throughout the theater of war. Among these are the proper function of the navy [cyber
forces] in the war; its true objective; the point or points upon which it should be
concentrated; the establishment of depots of coal and supplies [cyberspace
infrastructure]; the maintenance of communications between these depots and the home
base [sustain cyberspace domain]; the military value of commerce-destroying as a
decisive or a secondary operation of war; the system upon which commerce-destroying
can be most efficiently conducted, whether by scattered cruisers [cyber attack
capabilities] or by holding in force some vital centre through which commercial shipping
[information] must pass. [42]
And so we have the same question faced by the Navy: should a cyber force restrict itself to
attacking only military targets? Or should it apply itself to the destruction of a nation’s
commerce; a so-called “guerre de course?” The question has been answered previously in this
paper, and remains that the only CoGs
reachable in cyberspace are financial,
economic, and informational. It is not
possible to cause capitulation by
attacking military assets in cyberspace,
and therefore should only be done in
support of another branch of service’s
mission or to defend your own
country’s territory or assets.

Figure 6 - The Well Worn Paths of Cyberspace - Critical
Satellite. [90]

Until the 1920’s, the great oceans separating the United States from other nations were
considered a buffer against attack; a part of our natural defenses which any enemy must cross in
order to do us harm. When aircraft could fly over the oceans, the Air Force also became part of
that defense. Now that both the air and sea may be bypassed—quite quickly, no less—the first
line of defense for any technologically advanced nation will reside in cyberspace. Dr. Lani Kass,
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former Director of the Air Force’s Cyberspace Task Force and Special Assistant to the Chief of
Staff of the Air Force agrees, stating: “The first battle in the wars of the future will be over the
control of cyberspace.” [10] However, Mahan recognized that:
The control of the sea, however real, does not imply that an enemy’s single ship or small
squadrons cannot steal out of port, cannot cross more or less frequented tracts of ocean,
make harassing descents upon unprotected points of a long coastline, enter blockaded
harbors. On the contrary, history has shown that such evasions are always possible, to
some extent, to the weaker party, however great the inequality of naval strength. [42]
This assertion is borne out by modern Navy doctrine as well:
“Control of the sea, however, has both spatial and temporal limits. It does not imply
absolute control over all the seas at all times. Rather, control of the sea is required in
specific regions for particular periods of time, to allow unencumbered maritime
operations.” [16]
This is surely true for cyberspace as well. The only difference is that while small forces
slipping out of a naval blockade may cause little harm, small commands or file uploads slipping
past a cyber blockade could unleash a self-replicating virus that infects and crashes countless
servers and desktops. Therefore, passive containment and defense is not what is called for. In
order to stop the cyber enemy from slipping past your blockade to attack your digital shores, you
must destroy him, just as the Navy and the other branches of service advocate within their
respective domains. As Mahan said:
There is defence pure and simple, which strengthens itself and awaits attack. This may
be called passive defence. On the other hand, there is a view of defence which asserts
that safety for one’s self, the real object of defensive preparation, is best secured by
attacking the enemy. [42]
Likewise, modern navel doctrine states: “War at sea emphasizes the offensive, bringing to bear
information, intelligence, and tactical initiative against an adversary.” [16] Similarly, passive
defense does not lend itself well to Cyberspace. The longer you lie still and allow an enemy to
beat on your doors, the longer you give them to find a way around or through you.
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Mahan postulated that there are six conditions affecting the sea power of nations. These
are geographical position, physical conformation, extent of territory, number of population,
character of the people, and character of the government. [42] Most of these conditions do not
hold for cyber power, as we shall see.
First, geographical position was important to Mahan in that if a “nation were so situated
that it is neither forced to defend itself or induced to seek extension of its territory by way of
land, it has, by the very unity of its aim directed upon the sea, an advantage as compared with a
people whose boundaries are continental.” [42] In Cyberspace, geographical position is
unimportant except for a kinetic attack. Anyone may attack anywhere at any time as long as the
host is connected to the internet. Servers may be hosted in other countries, and infrastructure
may be owned by another nation’s corporations, but location in cyberspace is logical (virtual)
and as of yet host internet protocol (IP) addresses do not change easily.
Secondly, when Mahan spoke of physical conformation, he was referring to the seaboard
of a nation and whether it was long or short and whether it had many deep harbors or not. [42]
Physical conformation can be said to play a role in cyber power. If a nation is connected by “fat
pipes” such as OC-768 they will have a bandwidth advantage over nations with smaller ones.
This will help with the launching or absorbing of botnet DOS attacks and the effects of wildly
propagating virus traffic, but has little effect on more elegant single-target intrusions or attacks.
Furthermore, since cyberspace is a man-made environment, humans can shape its conformation
to their will. The placement of firewalls, routers, etcetera all have an effect on security and
therefore afford more relative power.
Third, by extent of territory Mahan had reasoned that the more coast-line a nation had
(assuming the sufficient amount of manpower to garrison it), the more sea power it could bring
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to bear. [42] This element does not play a role in cyber power. In fact, having a large presence in
cyberspace places you at more risk since you have more area to defend. Having more real estate
in cyberspace means you must also spend more to safeguard what you have, but does not mean
you also gain more offensive capability, offense being related to intelligence and not mass. The
one caveat to this is again botnets for DOS attacks, but such attacks are extremely crude and do
not cause lasting damage.
Fourth, number of population, is somewhat important but not for the same reason it is in
determining sea power. For Mahan, it was important because bodies “readily available for
employment on ship-board and for the creation of naval material” [42] were something easily
procurable, as the profession could be taught to most anyone. As it relates to cyber power, which
needs relatively few but yet highly skilled people, number of population matters only in that it
increases the pool and chances that you will have some of these individuals available to utilize in
the defense of the nation.
The fifth element, national character, was important to Mahan in that he believed the
character and aptitudes of the people would affect the development of sea power. “If sea power
be really based upon a peaceful and extensive commerce, aptitude for commercial pursuits must
be a distinguishing feature of the nations that have at one time or another been great upon the
sea.” [42] This element holds for cyberspace. The internet is mainly a tool for commerce and
flow of information and knowledge. Commercial interests will always research and develop
cyberspace technology if it affords them more capital, and users will always innovate if it affords
them more utility and knowledge. Any nation which rises to greatness in cyberspace will have a
love of commerce and knowledge.
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Lastly, the character of the government was put forth by Mahan as the sixth element
determining the sea power potential of a nation. He noted that “a government in full accord with
the natural bias of its people would most successfully advance its growth in every respect,” [42]
and indeed this seems to be the case in regards to cyberspace as well. The United States—
capitalistic as it is—surely loves commerce as much as its people do, and as a result is the largest
innovator of cyberspace technology in the world: The internet originated in the United States, it
hosts 6 of the 13 world-wide root domain servers, and American-designed router, switch,
firewall, and intrusion detection systems are produced in and sold to countries world-wide. Its
love of the freedom of knowledge has been called into question as of late, but so far no great
strides have been taken to stem its flow. Should a government fall out of accord with its people,
its power in cyberspace would surely suffer, as vulnerabilities would no longer be called to
authorities’ attention but kept safe for private use.
These elements of sea power have stood the test of time, and nations’ power at sea have
peaked and ebbed according to their dictates throughout the pass of centuries. Today, the sea
and cyberspace both play more of a role than ever in the commerce of a country:
World economic stability depends upon vigorous transoceanic trade. Today, 90% of the
world’s trade and 99% of our import-export tonnage is transported on the sea…
Ensuring that the world’s sea lanes remain open is not only vital to our own economic
survival, it is a global necessity. [16]
Along the same lines, e-commerce sales in 2008 reached a value of $204 billion. [56] Obviously,
both the sea and cyberspace are extremely important economic landscapes. Mahan believed that
naval strategy should not only promote sea power during times of war, but also during peacetime
in order to protect this wealth of nations. “Naval strategy has indeed for its end to found,
support, and increase, as well in peace as in war, the sea power of a country.” [42] This statement
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obviously holds true for cyberspace as well. Let’s take a look at how the modern US naval
strategy aims to gain sea power and then relate their policies to cyber power.
The modern Navy emphasizes control of the sea as the greatest goal during warfare. And
indeed, the ability to control, whether it be the sea, of air, or cyberspace is always a measure of
the power you possess. Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare states that control of the
sea can be accomplished through decisive operations by:
Destroying or neutralizing enemy ships, submarines, aircraft, or mines. Disabling or
disrupting enemy command and control. Destroying or neutralizing the land-based
infrastructure that supports enemy sea control forces. Seizing islands, choke points,
peninsulas and coastal bases along the littorals. Conducting barrier operations in choke
points that prevent enemy mobility under, on, or above the sea. [16]
Looking for similarities, we find many that we can apply to the control of cyberspace. The first,
destroying or neutralizing the machines of war, is difficult in cyberspace. Unlike building a
strong navy—which requires a tremendous investment and industrial capacity—building a
cyberspace capability is relatively cheap. The computer on which an enemy hacker plies his
trade is of the utmost unimportance and easily replaceable. It is the hacker himself, his
knowledge and intelligence that is the true weapon. Therefore, the first item on the Navy’s list
might say “Locate and destroy or neutralize enemy cyber combatants,” if we are to apply it to
cyberspace. Next, disabling or disrupting enemy command and control is highly important,
regardless of the warfighting domain and is critical in controlling that domain. Third, destroying
or neutralizing the enemy hacker’s control infrastructure (how the enemy communicates targets
and priorities to combat assets) may not map to cyber power, as distance from command and
control is not a prerequisite to controlling a cyber force as it is in a naval force. Combat forces
may even be co-located with leadership, and therefore controlling a hacker may be as easy as
shouting down the hall at him. Destruction of the actual physical infrastructure of cyberspace,
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however, is a highly effective means to countering an enemy’s ability to attack, albeit
counterproductive to forces wishing to capture and control it. Fourth, seizing islands, choke
points, peninsulas and coastal bases could be compared to seizing control of key routers and
entry points that connect an entity to the outside world, and lastly, conducting barrier operations
in choke points to prevent enemy mobility is a task that can also be accomplished in cyberspace.
Once you hold the key routers as partially illustrated in the above figures of the “well-known
routes of cyberspace,” a country could be isolated very rapidly from the rest of the world.
But what exactly does all this control gain us? The Navy recognizes that the control of
the sea allows them to:
Protect sea lines of communication, deny the enemy commercial and military use of the
sea, establish an area of operations for power projection ashore and support of
amphibious operations, and protect naval logistic support to forward deployed battle
forces. [16]
The first two are very important results of the control of cyberspace as well, and the last two are
not. Communication of commands, communication of information, and communication of
commercial transactions are the whole purpose of cyberspace, and so protecting them are
obviously of the utmost importance. Denying the enemy commercial and military use of
cyberspace is equally important, considering much of the warfighting capabilities of the other
branches of service rely on cyberspace to operate. Also, the asymmetric nature of cyberspace
means that technologically advanced nations will usually have more to lose in cyberspace than
less advanced nations. Establishing an area of operations for power projection could be a factor
for cyber power. This includes the home-based infrastructure as well as gaining access points
into adversary networks. Lastly, projecting logistic support to forward deployed battle forces
does not play a significant role in cyber power. However, providing tactical support may if
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special cyber capabilities are to be embedded within Special Forces or regular army units as they
move forward across a hostile territory or battlefield.
Now that we know why power at sea is important, what elements influence its potential,
what power at sea means, and what it affords you, let us talk briefly of the two styles of warfare
the Navy recognizes and see if we can apply them to cyberspace.
The United States Navy recognizes and practices two styles of warfare. These two styles
are termed Attrition Warfare and Maneuver Warfare. In the first, naval forces set out to
destroy as many of the enemy naval assets as possible over a period of time, essentially
wearing down the enemy. In the latter ...it emphasizes the need to give the commander
freedom to deal with specific situations. Maneuver warfare is further characterized by
adaptability and is not limited to a particular environment. [16]
Both of these styles are applicable in cyberspace as well. Attrition warfare only works when one
side can develop, sustain, and generate replacements for forces and equipment that have been
lost. Eventually one side is driven to the point at which it can no longer generate combat power,
or decides that the cost of continuing the conflict has become prohibitive. As discussed earlier,
information technology devices are relatively cheap, so attrition of combat capability would
seem more applicable to the destruction of talent. It takes time to identify, educate and develop
cyber warriors with the appropriate skill sets, which is similar to the length of time required to
manufacture capital ships. A similar situation occurred in WWII when the German Luftwaffe
suffered severe attrition of its pilots. Late in the war, most of Germany’s experienced pilots had
been capture or killed, and the ones coming out of flying school were no match for Allied pilots.
Maneuver warfare is perhaps more important and relevant. Cyber warfare is the ultimate in
maneuver warfare—cyberspace compresses time and space (much like aircraft did compared to
ground vehicles). A cyber attack can occur at any time, at any place, with little or no warning.
In the physical domains, it is possible to detect an adversary preparing for military action—
movement of troops, ships and aircraft—but there is no real early warning system for cyber
65

attack. Response time is also a significant challenge in that by the time a cyber attack has been
detected and attributed (which in and of itself may be very difficult), it may be too late to
respond in a meaningful manner. Cyber defenses and systems will need to become more
autonomic, free to make rapid decisions regarding the safety of their assigned areas of operation.
Again, this is similar to the Navy’s distributed command and control philosophy, known as
command-by-negation, in which ship commanders are afforded a great amount of autonomy and
discretion in the conduct of their missions. This is necessary for the Navy because its
commanders operate far away from their higher headquarters. Having to call back for guidance
and decisions was not feasible due to the time constraints. This is an interesting paradox with
cyberspace. On one hand, because it compresses time and space, the information can be
transmitted to and from headquarters quickly. However, the speed and lack of warning of attacks
in cyberspace tend to question whether a centralized command and control structure would really
work for cyberspace defense.
As we have seen so far, cyber warfare shares the least in common with warfare in the
Land domain, since terrain, maneuver (not to be confused with the “maneuver” principle of war),
and fires play less of a role in cyberspace. We have also seen that war in the cyber domain
shares many parallels with the sea, in that both are domains characterized by economic and
informational trade which flows along certain paths that may be blockaded, and that commanders
must have the autonomy to make quick but far-reaching decisions. Now let us turn to the
domains of Air and Space to see what lessons we may apply to cyberspace.
Power in the Air and Space
The European War was only the kindergarten of aviation. It had machines that were just
invented, the possibilities of their use were just beginning to be understood by the
aviators themselves, while others looked on them as strange creations that were defying
all known laws of science, of custom and of war.[35]
-William “Billy” Mitchell
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Like sea, the air domain has many parallels with cyberspace. The similarities include the
fact that cyberspace enables and affects the other domains; the fact that cyberspace compresses
time and space, allowing forces to “fly over the terrain” and strike at the enemy’s interior; and
the importance of controlling the cyberspace domain to facilitate control in the other domains.
As with the other domains, certain names stand out regarding airpower theory. They are
Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell. Their histories were discussed previously; we will now delve
directly into their theories, doctrine, and strategy.
Douhet was a proponent of a strategic, offensive air force while Mitchell advocated a
more tactical, offense/defense balanced force. Douhet wrote: “[The Air Force] is an offensive
force which can strike with terrific speed against enemy targets on land or sea in any direction,
and can force its way through any aerial opposition from the enemy.” [23] This flavor of air
power lends itself well to an absolute war carried out through cyberspace. It is true that cyber
warfare favors the offense, and like an air force, a cyber force may strike at lightning speed on a
global level. It can force itself through any opposition as well (since the enemy cannot
completely disconnect itself and still retain functionality), but not with mass as Douhet suggested
nor stealth as modern Air power prefers. Intelligence and cunning logic are the weapons that
will eventually defeat any cyber defense. Douhet was a follower of the Clausewitzian school of
thought and believed that the goal of air power was to “inflict the greatest damage in the shortest
possible time.” [23] He would have loved absolute cyber war, where massive damage can be
caused in the blink of an eye. Additionally, Douhet wrote “Like a cavalry corps, whose best
defense is always to attack, the air arm depends upon attack for its own best defense, to an even
greater degree, in fact.” [23] This can also be said of cyber power, which so greatly favors the
offense. Douhet also believed that the control of the air should be used to destroy “the vital
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centers” of the enemy, or his will to fight and industrial backbone, and that it should be done
with the maximum amount of force possible. [34] This, particularly, is pure Clausewitz and
works very well in an absolute cyber war. However, he also wrote: “We must resign ourselves
to the offensives the enemy inflicts upon us, while striving to put all our resources to work to
inflict even heavier ones upon him.” [23] This, of course, is not true in cyberspace. Defenders in
cyberspace need not resign themselves to enemy offenses, as there are many methods and means
of defense which may be effective in blocking damage to the possible centers of gravity residing
there. Because of this, even though cyber power favors the offense, defense cannot be neglected.
Mitchell’s ideas, on the other hand, take aerial defense into much more consideration and
lend themselves well to a limited cyber war where the force is providing support to operations in
other domains. Even though he was of the strong belief, as was Douhet, that air power was
supremely important and a force which would determine the victors of future wars, he still wrote
“Of course, everything begins and ends on the ground. A person cannot permanently live out in
the sea nor can a person live up in the air, so that any decision in war is based on what takes
place ultimately on the ground.” [47] Mitchell also said “you will never eliminate the land forces
entirely from the air, but you will greatly affect them.” [35] He saw air power as a more tactical
force than did Douhet. He explains: “[Attack aviation’s] specific mission is to attack troops,
trains of automobiles, convoys, railroad trains, tanks, debarkations from trains, ships or vessels,
warships, or any military object on the ground or the water which exposes itself to attack from
the air by cannon, machine guns, or lightweight bombs.” [45] Mitchell’s ideas are currently
being applied in certain limited cyber engagements. Whether it is being put to use disabling or
confusing early warning radars or IADS for air forces or denying or disrupting adversary
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communications for land forces, cyber power is already being used in these limited, tactical
fashions. One has but to look to Russia’s invasion of South Ossetia to find an example.
Mitchell and Douhet agreed that the Air would become a decisive field of battle and that
the control of the air would dictate a win or a loss for the entire war. Douhet wrote that the goal
of Air power was “to conquer command of the air—that is, to put the enemy in a position where
he is unable to fly, while preserving for one’s self the ability to do so.” [23] while Mitchell wrote
“Should a nation, therefore attain complete control of the air, it could more easily master the
earth than has ever been the case in the past” [47] This is also extremely valid in the case of
cyberspace, but only against nations who are reliant upon it. If a nation is used to waging war in
a “primitive” non-net-centric fashion, the denial of cyberspace will have little effect on the
overall outcome. This is true of asymmetric conflict in which the two combatants will select the
style of warfare (e.g., guerilla or attrition) that best fits their situation and constraints. However,
if the nation being attacked has also become reliant upon net-centric warfare as we have, then the
denial of cyberspace will greatly diminish the power of their military forces; this is especially
true if people have forgotten how to function without cyberspace.
Modern air power doctrine sides more with Mitchell’s theories than with Douhet’s, not
because Douhet’s ideas have been disproven, but because American 21st century values, ideals,
and morals preclude the use of overwhelming destructive power upon a nation’s cities and
populace. However, the strategic nuclear option has not been taken off the table for use in cases
of extreme necessity. Our air force is much more tactical than it was in WWII, Korea, Vietnam,
and the Cold War because of the technological leaps that were made in the late 80’s and early
90’s with “smart” weaponry and guided munitions. Strikes from the air have become extremely
surgical. Carpet bombing cities is no longer necessary to achieve an objective; targets of value
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may be singled out and destroyed with very little collateral damage. Technology has also
changed the meaning of Mass. Whereas Mass used to mean hundreds of airplanes in the air,
flying a formation into enemy territory, it can now be achieved with just one B-2 bomber and its
massive 40,000 pound payload of independently targeted munitions. [58] This is similar to cyber
power in that mass can be had with just one computer and the right exploit, payload, or malicious
logic.
The US Air Force also embraces the nine Principles of War (including Mass as we have
discussed it in the previous paragraph). In addition to those, they have added seven Tenets of Air
and Space Power. They are: Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution, Flexibility and
Versatility, Synergistic Effects, Persistence, Concentration, Priority, and Balance. [63]
Centralized control is defined as “the planning, direction, prioritization, synchronization,
integration, and deconfliction of air and space capabilities to achieve the objectives of the joint
force commander,” and decentralized execution is “the delegation of execution authority to
responsible and capable lower level commanders to achieve effective span of control and to
foster disciplined initiative, situational responsiveness, and tactical flexibility.” [63] While this
tenet may work for the Air Force, who has a limited amount of specific types of aircraft with
which to accomplish set goals and objectives, it cannot work for a cyber force for reasons we
have discussed earlier such as the need for lightning fast reactions to neutralize incoming threats
or to exploit time-critical vulnerabilities such as a new, unpatched system being brought online.
Much like the Navy, decentralized control as well as execution is required. Additionally, a
Cyber Force would not be constrained by a limited amount of extremely high-dollar, specific use
assets.
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Flexibility “allows air and space forces to exploit mass and maneuver simultaneously,”
while versatility “is the ability to employ air and space power effectively at the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels of warfare.” [63] Both of these are also important to cyber power.
Like the air force, a cyber force would also be able to quickly shift from one campaign objective
to another, quickly and decisively. Once an integrated air defense radar station is taken down,
the soldier/hacker may then focus attention to a new priority such as a communications
substation or the power grid. New objectives may be given and attacked on the fly. Likewise,
the switch may be made from a tactical objective to an operational or strategic one in an instant.
There is no maneuvering of forces or tools, just a new IP and different system architecture.
Continuing, synergistic effects mean that “the proper application of a coordinated force
can produce effects that exceed the contributions of forces employed individually… the objective
[of modern war] is the precise, coordinated application of the various elements of air, space, and
surface power to bring disproportionate pressure on enemy leaders to comply with our national
will.” [63] While a cyber force may also produce synergistic effects in that it, in concert with
forces in other domains, can cause a disproportionate pressure on enemy leaders to comply with
our national will, it does not do this quite as well as an Air Force can. The reason is one of
observability. While an air force may fly over a battlefield and see firsthand the effects that it is
causing and then change its focus to meet new conditions, a cyber force is mostly blind to these
subtleties—predicting and measuring cyber effects remains a significant challenge. In the
absence of timely, accurate intelligence, the cyber force must infer much as to the enemy’s
reactions to its cyber attacks.
Additionally, air and space power is said to offer a unique form of persistence: “Air and
space power’s exceptional speed and range allow its forces to visit and revisit wide ranges of
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targets nearly at will. Air and space power does not have to occupy terrain or remain constantly
in proximity to areas of operation to bring force upon targets.” [63] If exceptional speed and
range along with unfettered access to attack targets at will is the hallmark of persistence, then
cyber power, which travels at extremely high speeds and with unlimited range surpasses
airpower in this regard.
Concentration means to “concentrate overwhelming power at the decisive time and
place,” [63] and is a tenet that also has meaning for cyber power. The Air Force is concerned,
and rightly so, with the dilution of power as more and more individuals call on the unique and
versatile support that air power brings to the table. This is mainly a function of the limited
resources available to the combatant commanders. A cyber force could have much more
capability to meet the varying requests for fire support. However, concentration is still important
in that hackers should concentrate their mental abilities against the “tough nuts to crack” until
their objectives are achieved. In the realm of network and computer exploitation, the more sets
of eyes on a problem the better. Someone may catch something that another has missed, or have
an idea that hasn’t been tried, thereby making the exploitation quicker. Concentration, however,
should only be utilized on these difficult targets as it would be a waste to allocate too many
talented individuals on simple problems—i.e., economy of force.
Priority refers to the need to manage the allocation of scarce assets. Without a centrally
controlled prioritization process—that addresses allocation of capabilities and the targets being
attacked—air power can be significantly weakened. [63] This is the case with any force, but
more so for the Air Force because of the aforementioned lack of resources. Targets must also be
prioritized for a cyber force in order of importance, but in some ways, it is much easier to meet
the demands likely to be placed upon them in wartime, because cyber attacks do not have the
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same logistical issues as conventional air operations (fuel, ordinance, travel times, air frame
repair and maintenance, etc.). It is conceivable that a large team of network attackers may
engage a target list in very short order from the comfort of their home duty location. EW is a
different matter, since EW attack platforms, such as the EC-130, are few in number.
Finally, balance refers to the need of an air commander to “balance combat opportunity,
necessity, effectiveness, efficiency, and the impact on accomplishing assigned objectives against
the associated risk to friendly air and space forces.” [63] A cyber commander must also take
these things into account, as they are just as important: opportunity is something that should be
pursued, as a vulnerability that exists today may be patched tomorrow; necessity dictates that we
accomplish the objectives set forth by the combatant commander and by so doing expedite the
war; effectiveness means that we don’t waste time trying to break into systems which would
have a low impact on the enemy; efficiency means that we do not wish to spend inordinate
amounts of time on well defended systems when there are others that are more poorly defended
(the principle of economy of force also applies); and cyber “fratricide,” some examples of which
would be the jamming of allied signals, destruction of enemy hosts that some allied unit wanted
left intact, or allied soldiers plugging a piece of equipment into an enemy network that has been
infected with a coalition virus, should be avoided.
As regards space doctrine specifically, there are no principles, tenets, or ideas not covered
by the above general “air and space” doctrine. AFDD 2-2, Space Operations, AFDD 2-2.1,
Counterspace Operations, and JP 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, all speak in terms of
missions, roles, and capabilities, but not of theory. As was mentioned in Chapter II, military
space warfare theory is lacking, and this will likely remain so until space becomes a contested
environment.
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As we have seen, power in cyberspace shares much with power in the air. It is very much
a form of maneuver warfare, and is flexible, versatile, and persistent. It affects all of the other
domains, is very precise, and concentrates mass into a very small force. It can be used either
strategically or tactically, should be employed both offensively and defensively, and should be
balanced in its application. Let us now finally turn to cyber power proper.
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IV. Cyber Power in the 21st Century
Cyber capabilities can assuredly support applications of other force capabilities, but,
fundamentally, they are not the destructive, kinetic purveyors of violence that war
fighters traditionally envision in planning military strategy, engagements and wars. If we
apply them as primary weapons of war, then basic concepts regarding the use of force or
threat of force to compel the enemy must change.
-Sebastian M. Convertino[13]
…Improvement of weapons is due to the energy of one or two men, while changes in
tactics have to overcome the inertia of a conservative class; but it is a great evil.
-Alfred Thayer Mahan [42]
Clarifying the Environment
As we have seen from the examples other domains provide, Mahan was correct when he
postulated that environments shape strategy. [42] In order to come to terms, then, with what
cyber power is and what it can and cannot be used to accomplish, one must first define
cyberspace (the machine environment) and catalogue the warfighting characteristics of its
environs. This is a tricky business, as many scholars, politicians, and strategists have already
attempted to do just that… but still, 40 years after the “creation” of cyberspace, there is continual
argument and redefinition of exactly what cyberspace is. Here are some pertinent DoD
definitions:
Cyberspace is “the notional environment in which digitized information is communicated
over computer networks” [74]
And:
Cyberspace is a “domain characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic
spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems and associated
physical infrastructures.” [73]

And:
“Cyberspace is the nervous system… the control system of our country. Cyberspace
comprises hundreds of thousands of interconnected computers, servers, routers, switches,
and fiber optic cables that make our critical infrastructures work.” [28]
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And:
Cyberspace is “a global domain within the information environment consisting of the
interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet,
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and
controllers.” [26]
The definition that is currently used by the warfighting community is the one put forward by the
office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense in its May 2008 memo, subject: The Definition of
“Cyberspace” which is quoted directly above. This is a fairly good definition, but it still fails to
convey the full scope or reality of cyberspace. First, it is written for an “information
environment,” which as was discussed in Chapter II, cannot be an environment. Next, it tries to
be all-inclusive by spelling out exactly what comprises Cyberspace, and by so doing has limited
its scope to current technologies. Finally, the wording “the interdependent network of IT
infrastructures” is most certainly incorrect, as not all networks are interconnected with one
another.
A definition that more fully captures the essence of the cyberspace domain’s environment
would be as follows: “cyberspace is the logical electromagnetic control network between two or
more machines.” This definition is elegant in its simplicity. Omitting terms such as
“electronics” does not discount nano- and bio-machines. Replacing “the interdependent network
of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks,
computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers” with “network between two or
more machines” acknowledges the fact that all systems are made up of individual machines and
emphasizes that an un-networked machine cannot really be a part of cyberspace. Further, not all
networks have a physical infrastructure (such as mesh networks), and that there are many standalone and isolated computer networks. And finally, the wording “logical electromagnetic
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control” reduces the complex down to what we are really trying to do - control or affect a
machine remotely via electromagnetic impulses or signals. The word “logical” is important, as a
high energy burst to disrupt circuits is more of a physical act than a logical one, and therefore
does not belong to cyberspace, at least according to this definition. A high energy burst is a tool,
much like a bomb is to the land and sea environments. Note that this differs from other opinions
which would include directed energy as a form of cyber warfare. [3] The problem with all of
these competing definitions is that they depend on the perspective of who is defining the problem
and what they care about. For the remainder of this report, the focus will be on the
logical/control aspects.
Power in Cyberspace
Extending Billy Mitchell’s beliefs to cyberspace, “Only a cyber force can fight a cyber
force. Only a cyber force can keep infrastructure operating, information flowing, satellites in
orbit, guided ordinance hitting targets, squads communicating with HQ, and units from getting
lost in war.” But what does power in cyberspace mean? There has been no formal definition of
cyber power by the DoD; what is meant by the word is taken for granted as being understood.
Some attempts by outside scholars have been made to fix the meaning more firmly. Dr. Dan
Khuel of the National Defense University defines it thusly: “Cyberpower is the ability to use
cyberspace to create advantages and influence events in all the operational environments and
across the instruments of power.” [38] This is a great definition, which illustrates that operations
in cyberspace can cause and/or influence events in any or all of the other domains, as well as in
its own. Further, he goes on to point out that just like power in any of the other domains, “while
cyberspace as an environment simply ‘is’, cyber power is always a measure of the ability to use
that environment.” [38] The previous chapter pointed out how each of the current services wield
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power (“the ability to do something,” as Billy Mitchell would have said) in their respective
domains. Let us explore now how cyber power might “do things” in its domain.
It is very important to recognize the truth of the two quotations quotations (Convertino
and Mahan) at the beginning of this chapter when speaking about the development of cyber
power. In order to win wars with cyber power, the capabilities of today and into the future must
be used in new and innovative ways despite a resistance towards change. Used as it has in the
past, cyber power is very effective at playing a supporting role to operations in other domains.
In order to come into its own, however, the rules of cyber warfare must be rewritten.
The previous chapter discussed similarities and differences between cyberspace and the
other domains of warfare. Although the lessons
that the domain of land gives to us are few in
terms of actual operations, they provide much
in the way of ideology that the Cyber domain
would do well to borrow. Shown is the Army’s
“Fundamentals of Full Spectrum Operations,”
modified for cyber power. Very little needed to
be changed from the original figure (Figure 20).
The Principles of War have been
carefully cultivated over many years, and as
Figure 7 - Fundamentals of Full Spectrum Cyber
Operations

such define such basic truths of warfare in any
domain. All of the principles are just as

pertinent to war in cyberspace as in other domains, as discussed previously. The changes occur
in the service-specific elements of combat power, their tenets, and types of operations.
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Elements of Cyber Power
Two of the Army’s elements of combat power have been changed, while three remain the
same but take on different significance. First, persistence has replaced maneuver. Recall the
army’s definition of maneuver as “movement combined with fire or fire potential to achieve a
position of advantage with respect to the enemy.” [69] Although there may be certain
comparisons to maneuver in cyberspace (such as taking over a system that the enemy network
trusts, but is less well protected than the actual target), it is all logical (virtual). In cyberspace,
there is no position of advantage (high ground) which affords the attacker an advantage simply
by virtue of his holding it. Therefore, persistence is exactly what is required to accomplish the
mission. It is possible to win through any cyber defense with persistence. If an attacker tries
long enough, hard enough, and creatively enough, he will find and exploit a vulnerability in the
target host or application. Persistence is what will eventually give you an advantage over the
enemy, and makes it the ideal replacement for maneuver. However if a target is too hardened
and time is of the essence, more direct, kinetic approaches may be more appropriate.
Second, firepower has been replaced with payloads. Whereas traditional positions, units,
and weapons systems have a limited amount of kinetic firepower that they can deliver, certain
cyber assets can deliver an unbounded number of payloads which are only limited by the
imagination, knowledge, and talent of the crafter. But regardless of whether your payload is a
logical bomb or a kinetic one; a microwave or an electromagnetic pulse; a trojan horse, a worm,
or even simple text; “[payloads] magnify the effects of [persistence] by [manifesting the
attacker’s will] and [disrupting, corrupting, or exploiting enemy systems; persistence] creates the
conditions for the effective use of [payloads].” [69] And indeed, what use would persistence be
without an effect at the end?
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Third, leadership remains the same. Leadership is required to “focus the other elements
of combat power and serve as the catalyst that creates conditions for success” and to “provide
purpose, direction, and motivation in all operations.” [69] This is just as true for a cyber force
and all can agree that units without effective leadership will not sustain a concerted, competent
function in war or in peace.
Next, protection still means the “preservation of the fighting potential of a force so the
commander can apply maximum force at the decisive time and place.” [69] To a cyber force, this
means that friendly systems and infrastructure must remain uncompromised by outside entities.
This may require force, for as the Army so succinctly states, “protection is neither timidity, nor
risk avoidance.” [69] Protection minimizes the effects of enemy persistence, payloads, and
information, and may include offensive actions to halt enemy activity. To put it another way, as
Clausewitz once said: “Even in a defensive position awaiting the enemy assault, our bullets take
the offensive. So the defensive form of war is not a simple shield, but a shield made up of welldirected blows.” [12] The Army goes on to say: “These actions conserve the force’s fighting
potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporates the coordinated and
synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint
force while degrading opportunities for the enemy.” [69] With all of the long precedent for
offense required to protect oneself from attack, one can see that the current “tying of hands” as
regards cyber capabilities is not only unwarranted, but dangerous.
Finally, information also remains much the same. Information “enhances leadership and
magnifies the effects of [persistence, payloads, and protection].” [69] Information and
intelligence are required if one is to mount effective operations, as it allows leaders to best
concentrate persistence and payloads at the decisive place and time. Good situational awareness
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and intelligence also allows leaders to make decisions more quickly. For instance, if information
about an enemy network has been gathered to include operating systems, patch levels, and
installed programs on all connected machines, any order to attack that network could be carried
out quickly and easily. Information may also be highly dynamic; a new machine brought online
could be in an un-patched state for only a very brief amount of time before it is updated.
Information such as this could lead to a decisive decision to install a back door on the target
machine for later use. In short, the gathering of information is extremely important in forming a
common operational picture and discovering exploitable advantages.
Tenets of Cyber Power
The tenets may remain mostly the same for a Cyber Force, but with one substitution.
Depth has been replaced with creativity, as will be discussed later. First, however, let us discuss
initiative. Initiative should be important to cyber operations for the same reasons it is on land: it
means to “set or dictate the terms of action throughout the battle or operation. Initiative implies
an offensive spirit in all operations.” [69] Again, we have a sample of the offensive tone that
must also pervade cyber operations. As we have explored earlier, cyber warfare favors the
offense, and the current defensive mentality must be changed. Because of this need and the
speed at which operations occur, cyber commanders and warriors should have sufficient latitude
to take the initiative when opportunities present themselves. It is true that “initiative requires
delegating decision making authority to the lowest possible level,” and that in the defense it
“implies quickly turning the tables on the attacker… taking aggressive action and… continuing
to seek offensive opportunities.” [69] On land, this mentality exists because the lives of our
soldiers are of the utmost importance (the Army’s most precious resource). It should exist in a
cyber force because our nation’s computer systems and cyberspace infrastructure are also of the
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utmost importance; attacks against them need to be taken more seriously. We do not tolerate
incursions into our sovereign airspace, land boundaries, or maritime zones; we should approach
cyberspace with the same defensive mentality.
Second, agility means the ability to adjust to changing situations quickly and easily. A
cyber force should be able to shift targets, objectives, missions, or even types of operations at a
moment’s notice without confusion or wasted effort. “Agility requires that subordinates act to
achieve the commander’s intent and fight through any obstacle to accomplish the mission.” [69]
Agility is doubly important to a cyber force because of the speed at which operations, and
therefore changing conditions, may occur. This tenet underscores the need for initiative.
Third, creativity has replaced depth as a tenet for a possible cyber force. To the Army,
depth means attacking an enemy all throughout the area of operations in order to deny him
freedom to maneuver, thereby affording yourself more space, time, and resources to achieve and
exploit success. [69] This is consistent with the use of John Warden’s theory for strategic air
attack which emphasizes parallel attacks against key operational and strategic nodes. [82] Since
there is no maneuver (in a physical sense) in cyberspace, attacking the enemy all throughout an
area of operations does nothing more than what occurs when the fourth tenet, synchronization, is
applied. Therefore, depth has been replaced with something that will more readily serve a cyber
force: creativity. Creativity is necessary in a force where every situation is different and there
are no technical orders, field manuals, or checklists to tell a soldier how to proceed. Creativity
enhances initiative and agility by exposing opportunities that may have otherwise gone
unnoticed. Creativity serves the same purpose as depth in the cyber realm, as it affords the more
creative force greater time and resources (space has no corollary) to achieve and exploit success.
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Additionally, it works hand in hand with all of the cyber elements of combat power and bolsters
the effects of persistence, payloads, leadership, protection, and information.
Next, synchronization remains relatively unchanged and means the “arranging of
activities in time, space, and purpose to mass maximum relative combat power at a decisive
place and time.” [69] This is just as important to a cyber force, for many reasons. For example,
there may be multiple redundant systems operating an enemy asset that a combatant commander
wishes disabled, information that allied forces want destroyed may reside on several backup
servers, or portions of infrastructure may need to go down at the same time a Special Forces
operation is infiltrating an area of enemy territory. Any of the positive results attributed to the
omitted depth tenet that a cyber force needs to retain fit here, as synchronization is much the
same principle but without the “denial of maneuver” element. Synchronous attacks launched
from stationary nodes in cyberspace can quickly overwhelm, overload, subvert, or destroy a great
number of enemy systems across an area of operations simultaneously.
Finally, versatility is kept nearly identical. “Competence in a variety of missions and
skills allows [cyber] forces to quickly transition from one type of operation to another with
[zero] change in force structure. Versatility depends on adaptive leaders; competent, [educated],
and dedicated soldiers; and well-equipped units. Effective training, high standards, and detailed
planning also contribute.” [69] One of the nice things about cyberspace is the adage “bits is bits”
—the flow of traffic through a network is the same, regardless of what the network is for
(administrative support, command and control, logistics, etc.). The same knowledge that gets
you through an enemy’s defenses can help you bolster your own. Therefore, trained operators
can just as easily conduct offensive operations as they can conduct informational ones, etcetera.
This lends a high degree of versatility to cyber power.
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Cyber Operations
Of course it’s no good having a powerful force if you don’t use it to accomplish things.
Using the Army’s model as a starting point, the four types of cyber operations are offense,
defense, inform, and support. First, offensive operations “seek to seize, retain, and exploit the
initiative to defeat the enemy decisively.” [69] This fits well with our Clausewitzian lessons from
earlier; that the purpose of war is always to defeat the enemy. [12] Operationally, this means to
directly or indirectly attack the enemy’s center of gravity and ultimately to make him concede to
your demands. Tactically, defeating the enemy ensures interim or supporting objectives are
achieved which make attacking centers of gravity easier. In cyber warfare, offensive operations
can take many forms: network attack, electronic attack, kinetic strikes, or some combination of
these. The warfighter has all of these options and more when deciding how best to defeat the
enemy and create the desired effect in and from cyberspace.
The purpose of defensive operations in any domain is to defeat enemy attacks. It is
interesting to note, however, what the Army has to say about defense just because it bears so
little resemblance to what we have traditionally done as defense in cyberspace:
Army forces defend until they gain sufficient strength to attack. Defensive operations
defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, or develop conditions favorable for
offensive operations. Alone, defensive operations normally cannot achieve a decision.
Their purpose is to create conditions for a counteroffensive that allows Army forces to
regain the initiative. Although offensive operations are usually required to achieve
decisive results, it is often necessary, even advisable at times, to defend. Commanders
defend to buy time, hold terrain, facilitate other operations, preoccupy the enemy, or
erode enemy resources. [69]
Let’s break this down into ideas we cannot apply to a cyber force:
1. Defending in cyberspace will not provide more strength. Focusing on defense comes at
the expense of bleeding away energy and resources because we are always reacting to the
adversary’s actions. It is possible that our strength might even erode over time.
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2. Defensive operations in cyberspace do not buy you time. Cyberspace is a contested
domain, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. Adversaries attack and probe
our defenses at the time and place of their choosing. Countering and responding to these
attacks does not delay, hinder, or dissuade further attacks.
3. For the same reasons as cited above, defensive operations in cyberspace also do not
economize forces or develop conditions favorable for offensive operations.
And to those we can apply to a cyber force:
1. Defensive operations defeat enemy attacks. This is given, but in cyberspace it takes on
even more significance. Since nodes of cyberspace may also be centers of gravity,
allowing the enemy to compromise them even once could be fatal.
2. Defensive operations normally cannot achieve a decision. As we have discussed earlier,
destroying the machines that an attack is coming from will barely slow down the attacks.
Cyber warfare favors the offense.
3. Commanders may defend to hold “terrain” and preoccupy the enemy. Keeping enemy
hackers out of friendly nodes preserves their computational power for the allied
commander. A system that has been compromised by the enemy can in turn be used to
launch other attacks; it also undermines trust in the cyberspace infrastructure at large.
Deceptive measures—such as appearing to strongly defend a fake network —can divert
an enemy away from attacking truly important systems or machines.
Applying land domain doctrine to cyberspace, we see that “successful defenses are aggressive…
they maximize [payloads], protection, [and persistence] to defeat enemy forces.” [69]
The stability operations function has been replaced by operations to inform as a cyber
force will have very few actual “boots on the ground.” The contribution of this type of operation
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is to inform a nation’s populace, and by so doing provide the exact same service as the Army’s
stability operations: namely, to “promote and protect US national interests by influencing the
threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment.” [69] In an
informational operation, cyber forces will see to it that allied messages are placed on electronic
media they are able to influence such as radio signals, television broadcasts, web servers, and
more. Key information or disinformation may influence said three dimensions of an operational
environment. Disheartening enemy combatants, false intelligence for enemy leaders, and truth to
dispel propaganda for civilians in enemy territory are examples which may serve to do just that.
Finally, support operations have a slightly different meaning to a cyber force. For the
Army they mean “assisting civil authorities, foreign or domestic, as they prepare for or respond
to crises and relieve suffering.” [69] To a cyber force it means to support ongoing friendly
operations in all domains. In either case, the purpose of support operations is still to “meet the
immediate needs of designated groups for a limited time” [69]; it’s just the groups and the needs
that change. Some examples of cyber support operations could be the provision of
communications or intelligence to forward operating Special Forces operatives, disruption of
enemy command and control before the Marines invade a city, or the disabling of integrated air
defense nodes before an allied air strike. Cyber support operations may also be useful in
peacetime, such as for providing communications to rescue personnel after a natural disaster has
destroyed a city’s infrastructure.
Propositions Regarding Cyber Warfare
Now that we have defined the elements of cyber power and focused them with tenets that
combine to bring power to bear in several kinds of operations, let’s take a moment to iterate the
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pertinent warfighting characteristics that manifest as a result of the nature of the environment a
cyber force operates in. These are:
•

Cyber warfare is asymmetric

•

Cyber warfare enjoys increasing effectiveness against actors with increasing degrees
of technological advancement

•

Cyber warfare favors the offense

•

Cyber warfare is direct in nature, unless used in a supporting role

•

Cyber warfare does not favor position or geography; the terrain is uniform

•

Cyber warfare occurs at a tempo much higher than traditional forms of warfare

•

Cyber warfare concepts of maneuver and retreat are completely different

•

Cyber warfare alone cannot win wars unless total war is acceptable

With these eight propositions, it is now possible to answer the question: what does it take to be
powerful in cyberspace? These points will be covered below.
Cyber warfare is asymmetric. That is, the cost of entry in terms of both wealth and
knowledge needed in order to perform attacks in cyberspace is far below the cost to defend
against such attacks. It is also asymmetric in that the importance of the machines being attacked
is far greater than the machines doing the attacking. A $200 dollar laptop with a pirated copy of
Windows OS installed on it attacking a financial system worth trillions of dollars is the ultimate
in asymmetry. If the attacking machine is destroyed, stolen or lost, the perpetrator buys a new
one. The financial system, on the other hand, is much more difficult to replace, which is why
risk mitigation strategies such as backups and fault-tolerant systems are employed (which in turn
increases the total cost of ownership).
“Military analysts say that the Chinese know their armed forces cannot match America’s
in a head-on confrontation, and they realize their nuclear arsenal pales in comparison.
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These imbalances have forced Chinese military planners to adopt what the Pentagon
calls “asymmetric” techniques—tactics that aim at a foe’s vulnerabilities—in order to
counter, or at least deter, U.S. military power.” [32]
“The next kind of warfare will be asymmetric warfare. Who is going to take on the
United States Army, Marine Corps, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Navy as probably the most
powerful force on the face of the planet?” [41]
Cyber warfare enjoys increasing effectiveness against actors with increasing degrees of
technological advancement. It is assumed that technologically advanced societies are also
dependent on that technology, which in turn means the society is more affected by the denial or
destruction of that technology. A full-scale cyber attack against Afghanistan or Tanzania would
largely be an exercise in futility, because these regions are extremely low-tech, with very little in
the way of networked machines to disrupt. [24] The attack would be barely noticed, whereas in a
nation such as Estonia it could be debilitating [43].
Cyber warfare favors the offense. Because networks are first and foremost a means of
communicating commands between machines, in order to be useful they must be connected and
operational. Additionally, with the technology of the day, their logical location (IP address)
rarely changes. This allows attackers to know exactly where target systems are located at all
times and to know that said systems will always attempt to process any malicious logic sent to it
by the attacker. A determined adversary may “jiggle the doorknobs” and “beat at the doors”
indefinitely unless the system in question is disconnected, which defeats the purpose of having it
networked in the first place.
Cyber warfare is direct in nature, unless used in a supporting role. Unlike warfare in the
physical domains, there is no benefit to an indirect approach in cyberspace. The enemy knows
where your networks are; you know where your enemy’s networks are; both you and your
enemy’s networks are available to be attacked at any time. There is no need for feints,
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subterfuge, diversions, or deception: If you want to attack a certain target, there is nothing
stopping you from going straight at it. You either succeed or fail in the attack. The caveat to this
is that when cyber power is used in a supporting role, it can most certainly be used indirectly,
and to great effect. Examples of this would be using Information Operations to “leak” some
information onto a blog about an invasion that is supposed to be taking place in one location
when it is really taking place in another, or by using electronic warfare (jamming) to degrade
radar coverage in one sector of the enemy’s air defense to make them believe an attack is coming
from that direction when in reality a B-2 is stealthily winging its way to a different target in
another location.
Cyber warfare does not favor position or geography; the terrain is uniform. In this
context, terrain refers to the networking terrain, such as the connections, the networking
protocols and means of data transmission. In this way, it is very similar to the domains of Sea,
Air, and Space. In the maritime environment, water is water and ships maneuver and float
(Archimedes’ principle of buoyancy and displacement) the same whether they are in the Pacific
or Atlantic or Mediterranean. The same holds true for air (Bernoulli’s principle and lift) and
space (Kepler’s laws of planetary motion). Cyberspace is the same. Electromagnetic energy
propagates through free space in a standard manner, and internet protocol networks function in a
consistent way. With that said, there is a significant difference between cyberspace and the other
domains. While the mechanics of energy and information transfer in cyberspace are standard,
cyberspace is constructed by humans, in that we use the standards and equipment to connect and
build cyberspace. In other words, we “build” and shape terrain when new networks are formed
or reconfigured. But the flow of information through the networks is well understood and
predictable.
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Cyber warfare occurs at a tempo much higher than traditional forms of warfare.
Because humans can never react in time to counter the first salvoes of a cyber attack, much of
the responses to an attack must be automated. The situation after the initial attack may also
begin to change and deteriorate extremely rapidly. Swift action needs to be undertaken to
prevent further harm, either by means of a counterattack (ideally) or isolation (undesirably).
Blocking the attacker may work depending upon the adversaries’ expertise – if IP’s from
multiple or unlimited different subnets are coming at you and blocking is impossible, isolation
may be preferable to compromise or destruction.
Cyber warfare concepts of maneuver and retreat are completely different. With current
levels of technology, nodes within cyberspace are logically stationary. There is no “high ground”
to rain blows upon your enemy from; no narrow defile with which to hold off a force five times
your size for months; no swamp to lead them into in order to bog them down (note that
honeynets would not be a form of maneuver as some have suggested—IP addresses are still as of
yet static—but a form of deception, like the building of wooden airplanes in WWII). If an
enemy is pressing you hard, you cannot withdraw your forces back over the last ridge to rest and
regroup; your firewall must remain where it is, taking on wave after wave of attack to protect
your intranet from compromise until either the attacker stops, is destroyed, or successfully
defeats your defenses. In this way, combat in the cyber domain is much like the trench warfare
of WWI, with your local area networks being your trench and the World Wide Web as no-man’s
land.
Lastly, cyber warfare alone cannot win wars unless total war is acceptable. Total war
encompasses attacks against your enemy’s populace. In order to cause enough damage to a
nation to force capitulation to your demands, any cyber attack would invariably affect the
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civilian population of the target nation to its extreme detriment. Because a large percentage of
cyberspace exists within commercial, civilian infrastructure, unrestrained cyber warfare “could,
in fact, be in the magnitude of a weapon of mass destruction.” [32] Attacks against financial
targets, electrical power grids, national leadership and government structures, etc. are all
potentially valid targets (and legitimate under the laws of war); however, commanders must
assess whether the second and third order effects of attacking these targets is acceptable.
So now back to our original question. What does it take to be powerful in cyberspace?
The Air Force believes that the control of an environment, be it air, space, or cyberspace, means
to assure the friendly use of that environment while denying its use to an enemy. [65] While this
is true, it is doubtful that a force will ever be able to completely deny the use of cyberspace to an
enemy; however, one becomes powerful by acknowledging the above eight propositions and
working to either mitigate or embrace each one and not try to ignore them or operate contrary to
them.
•

A nation wishing to be powerful in cyberspace will mitigate the asymmetry of cyber
warfare by increasing the cost of entry needed to oppose them. This can be accomplished
in a number of ways. Examples include using secure, proprietary operating systems, hard
and software that is not known by or accessible to bad actors. Ironically, this is exactly
opposite to recent trends in which government, military, and critical infrastructure
systems have become increasingly based on commercial off the shelf (COTS)
technology, largely to reduce operations and maintenance costs. Investing in “closed”
technology would prevent attackers from using widespread and freely available exploits
that are common to most commercial software. Another example would be
diversification, which is also contrary to recent trends in adopting a homogeneous
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environment based on a single technology, such as Microsoft Windows. Diversification
forces an adversary to become proficient in more than one type of technology, which
would in turn slow them down.
•

A nation wishing to be powerful in cyberspace must also mitigate the inordinate amount
of damage that a less technologically advanced actor may perpetrate. This may be
accomplished by ensuring that all security elements are placed out of band of operating
systems, sensitive information, intellectual property, and etcetera. In this way, an
attacker may not leverage flaws in logic to corrupt, disrupt, or exploit critical data.

•

In order for a nation to be powerful in cyberspace, it must embrace the fact that cyber
warfare favors the offense. Our current approach to cyberspace defense is not a strategy
for winning in cyberspace…it only drains resources, and despite the tremendous
advancements in security technology, we continue to fall behind, because new exploits
and vulnerabilities continue to appear. A different approach is required. It must take the
offense at all times, attacking its enemy ruthlessly even in the defense. It must recognize
that destruction of the enemy is the only way to end a cyber attack. There is nothing to
be gained in absorbing blows.

•

A powerful nation will embrace the direct nature of cyber combat. If a commander wants
a certain system taken offline, he should order that system attacked. Feinting at a
different target will not decrease the protections on the actual target (as an enemies cyber
defenses should always—except through mistake or incompetence—be at the maximum
level at any given time), and will only decrease resources that could be better employed
elsewhere.
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•

A powerful nation will embrace the uniformity of the terrain and seek intimate
knowledge as to the nature of electromagnetism. It will use this knowledge to develop
weapons and techniques for disrupting, manipulating, and intercepting enemy signals,
while likewise developing technology which assures the integrity, confidentiality, and
availability of its own electromagnetic transmissions.

•

A nation wishing to be powerful in cyberspace should both embrace and act to mitigate
the double-edged sword of extremely high-tempo operations. In the former, it will use
this speed in maneuver operations designed to strike numerous targets in the heart of
enemy territory, overwhelming the opponent’s OODA loop and thereby disorienting him
and causing chaos or collapse. In the latter, a powerful cyber force should lessen the
impact of these tremendous speeds by employing autonomic defense/react protections
and by delegating authority to respond to the lowest possible level.
Given the speed with which data or information moves in cyberspace, the decision
cycle during an operation may be compressed to seconds or milliseconds. This
characteristic of the domain requires the generation of predetermined or
automated responses to potential cyberspace attacks. Additionally, the
compressed decision cycle requires predetermined rules for intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) actions that enable counterattacks against
time-sensitive and fleeting targets. This places a premium on IPOE needed for
pre-planning. In cyberspace, responses to enemy actions take milliseconds versus
traditional joint air operations planning timelines. Therefore, prior planning is
necessary for success of both offensive and defensive operations to ensure our
freedom of action. [64]

•

In order for a nation to be powerful in cyberspace, it will mitigate the lack of maneuver or
retreat by employing redundant systems and backing up critical data to multiple
locations. If the enemy wins through your defenses and takes down a node, a powerful
nation will be able to “fight through” the attack and mitigate it as quickly as possible.
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•

And finally, a nation wishing to be powerful in cyberspace will embrace the fact that to
win a war through cyber power alone, it must be a total war. It will not shrink from
necessary but regrettable collateral damage, as anything less than a maximum effort to
destroy an enemy’s center of gravity within cyberspace (be it financial, economic, or
informational) simply cannot cause enough damage to force capitulation. Let us finish by
reiterating the wisdom that Clauswitz has given us; “war is an act of force, and there is no
logical limit to the application of that force.” [12]

Not only will a nation that has taken these eight steps will find itself a very “hard target,” but it
will also possess the ideology it needs to dominate cyberspace in the 21st century. America
already possesses the tools; all that remains is for her to prove Mahan wrong by overcoming the
inertia of the conservative class and changing her tactics towards war in the cyber domain.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
Research Overview
The research conducted and explained in this paper had three main objectives, which
were discussed in chapter one. Historical accounts have shown that in regard to dominion, much
as with nearly everything else in human experience, mastery requires specialization.
Additionally, both historical and contemporary writings indicate that long periods of trial and
error have created excellent strategic precedent as to the gaining and wielding of power in each
of the known domains. There is great wisdom in admitting that not much comes along within the
human experience that is truly new or unique, and that it is therefore possible to learn from past
mistakes if only one listens. Finally, a combination of the different services’ strategies, both past
and present, along with research of contemporary service strategies, was synthesized to create a
possible vision of future cyber power.
Conclusions and Significance of Research
Studying the reasons, precedents, history, successes, failures, ideas, and accepted truths
in this research concluded that it is necessary to create a separate Cyber Force if the United
States wishes mastery over and domination of Cyber Space. It was also determined that some,
but not all of the strategic lessons and operating principles of other domains may be applied to
aid in the creation of a comprehensive cyber strategy. The rest was synthesized from historic
precedent and contemporary research. What coalesced was a strong assertion of principles for
mastering the cyber domain which cry out for adoption under a separate cyber service.
Recommendations for Future Research
While this research detailed the differences of environment, and therefore principles and
strategy, which necessitate the creation of a separate cyber force, much research still needs to be
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accomplished in regard to the four types of operations a cyber force may undertake. How does
one predict the yield of payloads? How much persistence is too much? How does one assess
damage in cyberspace? How does one measure security? Trust? How much should one spend
on protections? How does a military service protect a utility company’s servers, or even a
private citizen’s PC? Should they? How much right to privacy do civilians have in cyberspace
if national security is at stake? What constitutes an act of war in cyberspace? The questions are
endless, and many good research topics abound.
Summary
Domains are portions of an environment you can exert dominion over. Dominion relies
upon strategy. Strategies are shaped by environment. History shows that separate military
services are required to master a strategy for each individual environment (and therefore
domain), and so every domain a nation wishes to master requires a separate service. These are
the lessons we have learned along our journey. So, too have we learned about the differing
strategies for environmental dominion held by the great historical military thinkers. We then
followed the evolution of their ideas to the modern-day strategies of the current services and
applied what we could take from each one, both historic and modern, to the cyber domain and
discarded all of the rest. What is left over is an envisioning of the strategy a hypothetical Cyber
Force must embrace, both to serve as a strong case for its independence and to successfully wage
war in this newest, evolving domain: cyberspace. It is a vision of…
Cyber Power in the 21st Century.
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